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The Many Guises
of Immigration Reform
Susan Pozo
Western Michigan University

During the last decade, policymakers, economists, and the
public at large have been engaged in a heated debate over
U.S. immigration policy. On one side of the debate are those
who advocate stricter limitations on immigration because,
even if immigration is beneficial to some, the gain is at the
expense of others. Most advocates of restrictive immigration
reform argue that it is the public's obligation to protect the
interests of low-skilled workers who are hurt by the entry of
aliens with whom they compete directly for jobs. On the
other side of the debate are those who argue that immigra
tion can only be beneficial. By preventing the free flow of
labor across national boundaries, we have little to gain and
much to lose.
In all, the immigration debate is multifaceted, with nearly
as many approaches to the problem, suggestions for reform,
and arguments buttressing the status quo as there are par
ticipants in the debate. Both advocates of reform and those
supporting the status quo make their cases in strikingly dif
ferent ways. This volume, which collects six papers delivered
as public lectures at Western Michigan University during the
1984-1985 academic year, reflects these many views about
the effects of immigration on the United States economy and
about reform of the current system.
The objective of most who advocate immigration reform
is to lower the effective immigration rate the combined
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flow of legal and illegal immigration. To that end, reformers
emphasize eliminating or at least reducing
significantly the current flow of illegal immigration.
Although many policies have been put forward to reduce this
flow, all essentially fall into one of two categories. On the
one hand, policies could be implemented that increase the
personal cost of migrating illegally to the United States.
Alternatively, the benefits that accrue to undocumented
workers could be reduced. In either case, fewer would
choose to incur the costs that accompany migration.
One way of increasing the personal cost of migrating il
legally would be to devote more resources to patrolling the
border. Increased surveillance would raise the probability
that an illegal migrant would be apprehended during cross
ing. Greater border enforcement may do little to deter the il
legal immigrant who crosses seldom and remains for a long
period in the U.S., but would increase significantly the costs
to the frequent border crosser, and in particular reduce the
number of commuters who live in Mexico and travel daily to
jobs in the United States. (As Michael J. Piore argues in this
volume, however, such a policy may paradoxically increase
permanent settlement as commuters choose to remain in
definitely in the U.S. since the probability of gaining entry
during subsequent crossings is decreased.)
Alternatively, detention of illegal aliens for an extended
period of time would also cause the personal costs of
uninspected entry to rise. Currently, an apprehended alien is
simply returned to his or her country of origin. Thus, the
pecuniary costs of apprehension are relatively small, con
sisting of one's earnings foregone during the detention
period and travel. With an extended detention period,
however, the pecuniary costs would be greater, rising with
the length of the detention period. Jagdish N. Bhagwati
makes a case for detention coupled with the development of
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an economic zone at the border which would provide an
alternative to entering the United States.
A problem arises with the implementation of policies that
increase the costs to aliens of illegal entry. The budgets of
agencies that would be responsible for implementing these
policies would need to be enlarged significantly. However,
such an increase is politically difficult to promote, given the
current need to curb government expenditures. Attention has
turned instead to reducing the benefits that accrue to illegal
entrants. For instance, if fines and penalties were imposed
on employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers,
illegal aliens would face greater difficulties and a smaller
probability of finding employment. Hence the returns or
benefits that accrue to illegal immigrants would fall.
Presumably the number of undocumented migrants would
fall along with the reduced incentives to migrate. This was
the approach of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill passed by the
House and Senate in 1984 but never signed into law. 1 Subse
quent attempts at immigration reform have continued to
focus on the imposition of penalties on employers who hire
illegal aliens.
The political appeal of reforms that reduce the benefits il
legal immigrants can expect suggests that the public views
these policies as less costly than border enforcement policies.
These perceptions may or may not be true.
How are taxpayers, employers, and consumers affected by
the two alternative approaches to immigration reform?
Border enforcement would presumably require a large infu
sion of tax dollars into the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to support a larger and more effective force of
border agents, and to finance the detention of illegal aliens in
some humane way. Taxpayers, however, would not be
spared under a system of employer sanctions. It is the con
sensus of most who favor employer sanctions that they be
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implemented hand-in-hand with a system that would allow
employers to verify the citizenship or immigration status of
individuals. It is imperative that this verification procedure
be virtually costless to employers in order to prevent
discrimination against legal aliens, such as Hispanics, who
might appear foreign. Hence, if employer sanctions were im
posed, a verification system would have to be financed
through the tax system. Either policy, border enforcement or
employer sanctions, would require large increases in the pool
of revenues used to implement and enforce federal immigra
tion law.
A further hidden cost of employer sanctions is noted by
Barry R. Chiswick in this volume. Chiswick warns that
employer sanctions are the equivalent of an employer tax, in
creasing hiring costs. Though intended to reduce the employ
ment of illegal aliens, this policy would have the additional
unintended effect of also reducing employment of lowskilled native workers.
Ultimately the economic effects of tighter border policy
and penalties against employers who hire illegal aliens may in
fact be identical. It may be necessary in either case for firms
to alter their input mix and to change usually
decrease their level of output. If, as some argue, there are
few native workers willing to take the jobs that aliens
generally hold, then imposing either restrictive policy will
cause the cost of unskilled labor to rise as the flow of illegal
aliens is curtailed. It follows that producing any given level
of output becomes more costly. But if native workers are
willing to work in jobs often held by aliens, costs are much
less likely to be affected by a reduced flow of immigrants.
The point is that it does not matter which of the two ap
proaches greater border enforcement or employer sanc
tions is taken. Production costs either rise or do not de
pending on the availability of domestic low-skilled workers.
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How then do consumers fare under the two alternatives?
Depending on how the employers' costs respond to fewer
aliens, consumers will either find prices of goods and services
rising or remaining unchanged. If adjustments are costly and
difficult to make if in fact firms find it necessary to alter
the production methods significantly due to changes in the
relative prices of inputs the reduced stock of immigrants
will likely be felt by the consumer as the prices of goods and
services at least partly reflect higher costs. If the firm's costs
do not change as a result of a smaller stock of illegal aliens,
then consumers will not see increases in the prices of goods
and services. Again, it is unimportant whether the policy im
plemented is border control or internal enforcement. The ef
fects on consumers are the same.
Whether in fact consumers are harmed by restrictive im
migration policy, and whether employers can expect costs to
increase, depends on whether illegal aliens and domestic
workers are good substitutes in production. This is an issue
that has received much attention but on which no consensus
has been reached. The answer to this question is important
not only because of the effects of immigration policy on the
consumer, but because it is important to understand the im
plications of policy alternatives on domestic workers.
Are native workers harmed or helped by restrictive im
migration reforms? If native workers and immigrants are
good substitutes, then natives will be helped by restrictions
as either their wages rise or their employment opportunities
improve compared with a more open border policy. If native
and foreign workers are complements in production then the
native workers gain from the availability of more foreign
workers and lose from restrictive immigration policy. If
some groups of native workers are substitutes for im
migrants, and others are complementary with immigrants,
then the impact of immigration restrictions would be
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uneven, and the potential for conflict over reform great. In
this collection of papers the issue of substitutability is
discussed in detail by George J. Borjas. Vernon M. Briggs,
Jr., develops an interesting implication of the debate over
substitutability by arguing that the current immigration
policy (or nonpolicy) undermines policy designed to aid
minorities and the poor.
Although there are direct costs of imposing immigration
restrictions, many argue that they are smaller than the costs
that are imposed by the existence of large communities of
legal and illegal aliens. Immigrants, they argue, participate
in income maintenance programs and strain public services
such as education and medical care. In addition, if im
migrants and natives are substitutes in production, increased
immigration may cause native workers to earn lower wages
and suffer more unemployment such that more become eligi
ble for public assistance. In sum, immigration may impose
greater costs on U.S. taxpayers than is immediately ap
parent. Some of these issues are addressed by Francine D.
Blau, who has analyzed data on the use of transfers by im
migrants and natives.
The immigration debate is not likely to be concluded in the
near future. There are too many opposing interest groups,
too little consensus over what are the important issues, and a
dearth of evidence that could be drawn upon to resolve these
differences.
NOTE
1. Differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill could
not be resolved.

Immigrants
and the
U.S. Labor Market
George J. Borjas
University of California
Santa Barbara

There has been a very rapid increase in the number of im
migrants admitted to the United States in the postwar
period. During the 1950-1960 decade, for example, an
average of 251,500 immigrants per year were admitted into
this country. This number had increased to over 390,000 per
year during the 1970-1980 decade. The rapid increase in the
number of immigrants has raised (again) the very old ques
tion of whether or not the U.S. benefits from immigration.
Surprisingly, even though immigration has been an impor
tant part of demographic change and of population growth
in the United States practically throughout its entire history,
very little is known as to how immigration affects different
sectors of the economy. Are workers, firms, and consumers
helped or hurt by immigration?
In this lecture I would like to try to provide an understand
ing of what facts we need to know before we can provide a
valid assessment of this important question. Despite what
self-appointed immigration experts claim, existing research
is so preliminary (and often so contradictory) in its conclu
sions that it is entirely inappropriate to make sweeping
generalizations based on that literature. Nevertheless, ex
isting research does provide valid hints and clues as to what
kinds of questions policymakers should be asking in trying to
assess the impact of immigration on the United States. My
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objective in this survey is to provide an outline of what cur
rent research has to say about this important issue: What
kinds of questions are relevant and what do we know about
the answers to these questions?
I should stress at the beginning of the survey that my focus
is exclusively on the economic costs and benefits associated
with immigration. This is not to say that there are not other
important issues e.g., the impact of immigrants on the
political structure of governmental units of the U.S.
However, most research has concentrated on the economic
aspects of immigration, and this, too, will be the focus of my
analysis.
There are two questions which I believe are most relevant
in any assessment of the economic impact of immigration.
First, how well do immigrants do in the U.S. labor market?
In a competitive labor market, workers are paid the value of
their marginal productivity. In other words, worf crs are
paid the value of the contribution that they make to the
firm's output. By analyzing how immigrants do in the labor
market, by studying the level of immigrants' earnings and
comparing them to the level of native-born earnings, we are,
in effect, calculating the value of the contribution that im
migrants make to national output. This research question is
the one that has received the most effort from social scien
tists interested in immigration phenomena. A common find
ing in this literature is that immigrants have lower earnings
than the native-born when they first arrive in this country,
but that over time the earnings of immigrants grow very fast
and eventually immigrant earnings actually overtake and
surpass the earnings of the native-born. It is not uncommon
in these studies to find that after 10 to 15 years in the U.S.
the typical immigrant is earning more than the typical nativeborn person. These kinds of findings not only help
perpetuate the Horatio Alger myth, but also have the impor-
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tant policy implication that immigrants, through their higher
productivity, actually make a significant contribution to
U.S. national product.
The second question that is relevant for an assessment of
the economic impact of immigrants "twists'* the first ques
tion around: from how immigrants do in the labor market,
to what immigrants do to the labor market? This is probably
the question that receives the most media concern. There are
endless anecdotes of immigrants arriving in the U.S. and
"taking jobs away" from specific groups of native-born
workers. Despite the appeal of such anecdotal evidence, the
fact remains that not a single shred of evidence acceptable to
a social scientist even with the most liberal standards of
scientific analysis has been produced substantiating these
anecdotal claims. Certainly, as immigrants enter the U.S.
labor market in large numbers it seems reasonable to expect
that these shifts in supply would have an impact on the earn
ings and employment of native-born groups. As will be seen
below, however, regardless of the magnitude of the shift in
immigrant supply, economic theory cannot predict unam
biguously the direction of the change in immigrant earnings
and employment. In particular, immigrants may
"substitute" for native-born workers (as the anecdotal
evidence implicitly assumes) or they may "complement"
native-born workers in the production process. All scientific
studies of this important question suggest that immigrants
have had a minor impact on the U.S. labor market, and not a
single study in this literature has provided evidence of the
large negative impacts assumed in media discussions of this
issue.
It is my contention that no valid assessment of the
economic impact of immigration in this country can be made
unless we can provide measures of the dollar costs (or
benefits) associated with each of these two issues. In the re-
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mainder of this lecture I will summarize the current state of
knowledge in each of these questions, and, with some luck,
raise some doubts as to how much we really do know about
any of these important policy issues.

The Earnings of Immigrants
How do immigrants do in the labor market? This ques
tion, by far, has dominated most of the empirical research in
the immigration literature. To address this problem the
researcher must simply compare the earnings of the nativeborn with the earnings of the foreign-born. In principle,
therefore, it is a trivial exercise. Despite the simplicity of this
task, however, the first such study in the modern literature
did not appear until 1978 when Barry Chiswick published an
influential paper on the "Americanization" of immigrant
earnings. Using the 1970 Census cross-section, Chiswick's
analysis revealed two major findings:
1. The earnings of recently arrived immigrants are
significantly lower than the earnings of immigrants who have
been in this country for longer periods; and
2. After 10-15 years, the earnings of immigrants overtake
the earnings of the native-born, so that earlier waves of im
migrants are valued more by the U.S. labor market than the
native-born population.
The thrust of these findings is illustrated in Figure 1. The
typical native-born age-earnings profile is upward sloping
throughout much of the working life cycle. The typical im
migrant migrates at age t0, and at that time his earnings are
significantly lower than those of the native-born population.
Over time, however, the earnings of immigrants rise at a
significantly higher rate than those of the native-born (as in
dicated by the steeper slope of the age-earnings profile of im
migrants in Figure 1). The difference in these slopes leads to
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Figure 1
Immigrant and Native-Born
Earnings Profiles
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an overtaking age of t, which Chiswick found was 10-15
years after age tg. Thus for a large portion of the life cycle
Chiswick found that immigrants had higher produc
tivity and hence were valued more by the U.S. labor
market than the native-born population. This remarkable
finding gave birth to the current conventional wisdom that
immigrants assimilate quite well in the United States.
These results have a great deal of appeal to labor
economists trained in the human capital tradition since
human capital theory can be easily invoked to explain (part
of) these empirical regularities. In particular, persons im
migrating to the United States for "economic" reasons have
strong incentives to devote a large fraction of their effort and
time to the process of accumulating human capital or skills
valued by U.S. employers. These incentives are, of course,
created by the fact that the typical immigrant incurred
substantial costs in immigrating, and the returns to these in
vestment costs can only be obtained through high earnings in
the U.S. labor market. These high human capital investment
volumes explain why immigrants' earnings rise at a faster
rate than native-born earnings. They do not, however, ex
plain the existence of an overtaking age since there is no ob
vious reason why the total stock of human capital should be
greater for immigrants than for the native-born. To explain
the overtaking point Chiswick introduces the deus ex
machina of "selection biases." That is, for reasons that are
not well understood, the immigration policies of the United
States (as well as the emigration policies of sending coun
tries) combined with the economic incentives motivating in
dividuals to migrate lead to an immigrant population that is,
on average, "better" than the native-born population. This
greater quality (in terms of earnings potential) of immigrants
is, therefore, responsible for the fact that over a large por
tion of the working life, immigrants apparently have higher
earnings than the native-born.
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An extensive literature developed following the ap
pearance of Chiswick's paper. This literature borrowed both
the conceptual framework and empirical methodology of
Chiswick's analysis, and, by and large, concluded that
Chiswick's results were quite robust. Cross-section studies of
immigrants by sex, by national origin, by race, etc., all led to
the same essential finding: after a period of adaptation (or
assimilation) immigrants do quite well in the U.S. labor
market.
A recent paper of mine (Borjas 1985a), however, questions
the validity of this finding. The fallacy in the Chiswick-type
literature is its use of cross-section data sets (a "snapshot"
like the U.S. Census) to explain the dynamic series of events
which we call "assimilation." In other words, it is incorrect
to study how different immigrants do (in terms of earnings)
at a given point in time, and to infer from that how the earn
ings of a given immigrant grow over time. There are two
serious biases which destroy the validity of this inference.
The first of these biases arises from the fact that many im
migrants eventually return to their country of origin.
Estimates of the emigration rates of the foreign-born
population in the United States range from 20-30 percent. It
is unlikely that the incidence of emigration is distributed ran
domly in the immigrant population. Instead, immigrants
who emigrate are likely to leave the U.S. for specific reasons.
One such possibility is that things simply did not work out
for them in the U.S. labor market. In a sense, then, the
"failures" leave the United States. If so, the earlier waves of
immigrants will be composed only of "successes," while the
more recent waves contain both "successes" and the
"failures" who will eventually leave. This kind of sample
composition will clearly lead to the result that earlier waves
of immigrants earn more, on average, than the more recent
waves even if no assimilation truly exists.
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The second problem with the cross-section results is the
implicit assumption that different waves of immigrants are
identical in average quality (even if there were no
emigration). This hidden (and heroic) assumption forces the
reader to believe that the quality of immigrants who arrived
in the U.S. in the 1940s is the same as that of immigrants
who arrived in the U.S. in the 1960s and in the 1980s. The
fact that U.S. immigration policy went through a major revi
sion in 1964 is enough to make an analyst aware of the implausibility of this kind of analysis. In addition, however,
political and economic upheavals in sending countries have
clearly had an impact on the size, on the racial, and on the
national origin composition of the immigrant flow to the
United States. If these events have led to a decline in the
quality of immigrants admitted to the U.S. in the postwar
period, the Chiswick-type cross-section result of Figure 1
would again be generated since earlier waves would be ex
pected to have higher earnings than the more recent arrivals.
In my 1985a paper, I address this problem by conducting a
joint analysis of the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Censuses. If the
cross-section studies are right, specific cohorts of immigrants
(e.g., Cubans who arrived in 1965-1969) should do substan
tially better in the 1980 Census than in the 1970 Census. In
fact, they do not. The tracking of a large number of im
migrant cohorts over the 1970-1980 period reveals that, in
most cases, the cross-section studies greatly overstate the ac
tual improvement that took place in immigrant earnings dur
ing that time period. Hence the reason that earlier waves of
immigrants earn more than the recent waves has little to do
with the assimilation stories that dominate the literature.
Rather it has to do with the fact that there has been a
precipitous decline in the quality of the immigrant pool ad
mitted to the U.S. in the postwar period.
There still remains the question, however, of what policy
implications, if any, are suggested by this revisionist view of
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Figure 1. Clearly, my results imply that the productivity of
immigrants has fallen over time. Yet, one can still ask: So
what? Is this secular decline in quality a good or a bad thing?
I do not know the answer to this question. Since the in
dustrial structure of the U.S. economy has changed rapidly
since 1940 (and will likely continue to change) it is unclear
that we need 500,000 professionals immigrating to the U.S.
every year. My results must, therefore, be interpreted in the
context of the kinds of jobs that are being generated by the
U.S. economy and not simply on the qualifications of the
new entrants.

The Impact of Immigrants
A complete assessment of the relationship between im
migrants and the U.S. labor market requires knowledge not
only of how they do in the labor market, but also of what
they do to the market. In other words, what is the impact of
immigrants on the earnings and employment of the nativeborn population?
It is easy to show that, despite the deeply held (and almost
religious) beliefs of many analysts who have studied this
question, theoretically it is impossible to predict whether im
migrants diminish or expand native-born employment op
portunities. Consider Figure 2. The first graph describes the
labor market facing immigrants: Sj is the supply curve of im
migrants and DJ is the demand curve for immigrant labor. In
a competitive labor market, the Lj immigrants employed
would earn earn Wj dollars. Suppose now that a political
crisis abroad leads to a sizable increase in the number of
foreign-born persons in the U.S. This crisis shifts the supply
curve for immigrant labor from Sj to S^, and, as expected,
even though more immigrants are employed in the new labor
market equilibrium (employment is now given by Lj), the
wage each immigrant gets is reduced to W[. In a sense, im
migrants compete for jobs with themselves, and hence an in-
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Figure 2 (continued)
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crease in the supply of immigrants must (in this simple
model) lead to reduced earnings opportunities for the entire
immigrant population.
The second graph of Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the
increased supply of immigrants on native-born earnings and
employment if it is assumed that immigrants and native-born
workers are substitutes in production. The curves Sn and Dn
are the initial supply and demand curves of native-born
workers. The shift in the supply of immigrants will likely
have an impact on the demand for native-born workers. It is
often claimed usually without any evidence that im
migrants and native-born workers compete for the same
kinds of jobs. Economists define this situation as one in
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which immigrants and native-born workers are substitutes in
production. That is, both foreign- and native-born workers
do the same kinds of jobs and hence the demand for nativeborn workers will fall to D^ when the supply of immigrants
increases. This shift in demand will lead to less native-born
employment and to lower native-born wages. In a sense, the
fact that immigrants and native-born workers are alike i.e.,
are substitutes in production implies that the entry of new
immigrants reduces the productivity of the native-born
population and hence reduces Wn. This is, of course, the
typical assumption in discussions of this issue both in the
media and in many academic articles.
There is, however, an alternative assumption that on a
priori grounds is equally valid: immigrants and native-born
workers are complements in production. This kind of
technological relationship arises, for example, when an il
legal alien mows the lawn at my house. We both gain: he gets
a job and a salary, and I get to devote my time to research. In
this scenario, the productivity of the native-born population
increases when new immigrants come in. As illustrated in the
third graph of Figure 2, this leads to an upward shift in the
demand curve for native-born labor increasing both nativeborn employment and earnings.
To repeat, it is theoretically impossible to predict whether
immigrants diminish or expand the employment oppor
tunities of the native-born. The direction of the impact of
immigrants on the earnings and employment of the nativeborn is entirely an empirical question and can be settled only
by reference to available data.
A few papers have attempted to conduct empirical studies
of this issue. (See Borjas 1983, 1985b, 1986; Grossman
1982.) The methodology in these studies is based on the in
sight that a few labor markets (or SMSAs) traditionally
receive most of the immigrant labor. Hence the comparison
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of earnings levels in these labor markets with the earnings
levels in labor markets with relatively few immigrants should
reveal the direction of the shift in the demand curve for
native-born labor. The results from the studies are sum
marized in Table 1. This table presents the estimated percent
age impact of native-born earnings (by type of native-born
worker) if the (white) immigrant population were to increase
by 10 percent. Table 1 reveals numerically trivial impacts.
The earnings of white native-born workers are reduced by
only 0.2 percent, while the earnings of black native-born
workers increase by 0.2 percent. These numerically trivial ef
fects suggest two important findings: First, the issue of
whether the demand curve shifts up or down is somewhat ir
relevant. Immigrants have practically no impact on the de
mand curve for native-born workers. Second, the many
discussions that implicitly assume a high degree of
substitutability between immigrant and native-born labor are
far off the mark. These discussions are not only misleading
and dogmatic, but are also erroneous.
Table 1
Estimates of Impact of Immigrants on Earnings of Native-Born

Type of native-born
worker
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
SOURCE: Borjas, 1985b.

A 10 percent increase in the
number of white immigrants
reduces or increases the earnings
of native-born workers by:__
-.2%
.2%
-.1%
.1%
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It should be stressed, however, that this type of study is
still in its infancy. Many more empirical studies of this type
are required before these results can form the basis for in
formed policymaking. Nevertheless, the few studies that do
exist, using different data and methodologies, cannot find
any evidence of sizable negative impacts. And this finding, in
light of the discussions that dominate the literature, is quite a
surprise.
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Can International
Migration be Controlled?
Michael J. Piore
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

I began working on migration in 1972 after spending a
year and a half in Puerto Rico. When I came back to Boston
at the end of that period it seemed to me that all of a sudden
there were Puerto Ricans all over Boston. I wasn't sure
whether that was an illusion on my part that came from a
sudden, heightened consciousness about Puerto Ricans in
general, or whether indeed, there had been a new migration
of Puerto Ricans to Boston. So I began to investigate the
origins of the Puerto Rican community in Boston.
In the process, I actually found the origins of the Puerto
Rican community in Boston. I went into one factory where
the employer pulled off the factory floor a gentleman who
said he had come to Boston in 1954. I asked him how large
the Puerto Rican community was in 1954 and he said, "Well
let me see. There was Juan, Jose ..." and he named eight
people. But, I also found that the Puerto Rican community
in Boston, while a lot larger in 1972 than eight people, was
also not all Puerto Rican. Indeed, a large number of the peo
ple who claimed to be Puerto Rican, or who at least were
presented to me as Puerto Rican, actually came from other
parts of the Spanish speaking Caribbean and many of them
were in the United States illegally.
At that time immigration was not a very much talked
about phenomenon, but since then, especially since 1972, it
21
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has become a focal point of public policy. In the last ten
years it appears to have gained a permanent place in the
public policy agenda. We have just gone through a long
debate over what is the latest piece of immigration legisla
tion, the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. While that legislation was
defeated, or at least tabled, it is almost certain that there will
be another piece of immigration legislation in the coming
Congress. So it is largely to that debate, raised by the im
migration reform legislation, and in light of a series of
research projects that began with that study of Puerto Rican
migration but extended from there to the issue of migration
in general, that I would like to address my remarks.

The Illegal Immigration Problem
The central concern in the public debate has largely been
clandestine immigration. Estimates of the number of people
in the country without proper documents range from 3 to 12
million. 1 Interestingly enough, those figures the 3 and the
12 million have remained constant over the ten-year
period. Most of these people are here to work, hence the no
tion that they take jobs from Americans. The rhetoric of the
immigration debate implies that, in addition, the existence of
so many people here in direct contradiction to announced
public policy, represents a threat to the general social order
and hence to the safety and security of the rest of us. Their
ambiguous legal status certainly places the people themselves
in a precarious social position. It makes it difficult to
educate their children, to obtain the protection of labor
legislation in the workplace, or off the job to obtain protec
tion from the abuses of landlords, moneylenders or the
wrath of angry relatives and neighbors or rejected suitors, all
of whom can at any moment in time turn them in to the im
migration authorities.
The dominant view about this immigration appears to be
that the immigrants are driven by a desperate attempt to
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escape the poverty and depression of their own countries,
which constitutes an inexorable force driving them towards
the United States. This view is not always made explicit but it
underlies the continual reference to the economic conditions
in places like Mexico, to the population pressures in the
underdeveloped world, and to the high unemployment rates
or so-called underemployment in these areas. Given the fact
that the United States is surrounded by poverty, it implies
that we will be inundated with immigrants. When figures
about income levels and population growth along our
southern border are presented in combination with the
figures about the numbers of clandestine immigrants already
here, it seems that we are already being inundated.

Alternative Policies to Control
Illegal Immigration
This notion of the immigration process invites a policy of
massive retaliation. To halt the invasion in this way, one
would have to control the two major streams of clandestine
immigration. One of those streams consists of people who
enter without inspection, that is, basically, cross the border.
The second group consists of a group called "visa violators'*
who enter with documents, largely tourist documents but
some student visas, and then violate the conditions of those
visas either by working while they are here or by staying after
the visas have expired.
Border Control: In principle, true border control is prob
ably possible. The U.S.-Mexican border is very long, but
most of it consists of desert which is difficult to cross and
easy to police with aerial equipment. Most of the entry oc
curs in large urban areas. The present border control force is
small. As the former Labor Secretary, Ray Marshall, was
fond of pointing out, the border patrol, in fact, is smaller
than the Capitol Hill police force. Current smuggling opera
tions are relatively primitive and unorganized. More
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resources alone would go a long way to counter those opera
tions.
On the other hand, the whole nature of the immigration
process undoubtedly changes under the impact of a massive
control operation. There would be an escalation both in the
technology and the organizational efforts on the other side
of the border and probably a change in the locus of entry.
Border patrol would thus undoubtedly be considerably more
expensive than it appears to be at the current time. The final
cost in terms of resources, not to mention human rights,
could be quite large. But in my own judgment, if the control
activity were done with a well-conceived and carefully im
plemented organizational structure, that is to say, if it were
not done in panic, it could probably be pulled off.
Visa Controls: Visa violations, on the other hand, are a
good deal more difficult to control. Almost all visa violators
come to the United States for ostensibly legitimate reasons:
to visit relatives, for tourism, shopping and for education.
Attempts to curtail visa violations by tightening up the pro
cedures through which visas are granted inevitably interfere
with these processes in very serious ways. The consulates
who issue visas are overworked and understaffed and could
easily absorb more resources. But it is not clear that more
resources alone would solve this problem. Resource con
straints seem, in fact, to be one of the major factors control
ling the number of visas actually issued at the moment. More
resources would probably make the process fairer, but might
actually increase the flow. It is very difficult to judge the ac
tual motivation of an applicant, and since many of those
who eventually violate their visas have legitimate reasons for
visiting the United States and may not even contemplate visa
violation in advance, it is not clear that the process could be
fully controlled in this way. I think it is important to note
that a lot of students who end up violating their visas really
do come here for education and change their minds only
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after they get here about whether or not they want to stay.
That's probably even more true of visitors who come from
foreign countries to visit friends and relatives and then
somehow stay longer than they intended, getting a job to
finance their extended stay.
Employer Controls: The difficulties of direct control, the
hopelessness of controlling visa violation, and the cost of
border control have forced attention on a third pro
posal employer liability. By a quirk in the immigration
legislation employers are in no way responsible for checking
the legal status of their employees. Reformers have
argued and this is one of the central provisions of virtually
every bill that has been proposed, including the SimpsonMazzoli bill that if employers were made responsible for
verifying the legal working status of employees, the jobs
which are the chief attraction for the immigrants would be
cut off, and immigration would dry up.
It is probably true that this would be the case, but job con
trol is no panacea. The exact nature of present employers'
liability has been somewhat distorted by the advocates of this
reform. Employers are not, it is true, liable for having un
documented workers on their payroll, but they are liable if
they actively and knowingly engage in recruitment. Such
recruitment has at times been fairly widespread although
very circumspect. The immigration service has not been very
successful in developing cases against this kind of recruit
ment, largely because such cases are difficult to prove
without extensive investigation which the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) does not have the resources to
conduct. More stringent forms of liability would reduce the
investigative burden, but only marginally.
For really effective enforcement, employers would have to
have some means of verifying the status of the job applicant.
This would necessitate a national identity card which poses
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apparently insurmountable civil rights problems. Such a
system would also be very expensive. Budget estimates run to
several billions of dollars. By themselves, therefore,
employer sanctions are unlikely to have much of an effect
one way or another. To be effective they would require a
massive infusion of resources for the immigration service.
These resources would be almost as effective under present
legislation if they were devoted to investigations and Im
migration and Naturalization Service raids of existing
employers, but we have consistently judged the cost of all
these activities to be too great. Thus, there is a sense in which
the flood of immigrants, which the conventional view
predicts, seems inevitable. American culture seems doomed
to either drown in a sea of foreign languages and alien
customs, or to degenerate as the immigrants drive down our
standard of living and we divert increasing resources to
securing our borders and make progressive compromises on
our basic human values in order to keep aliens out.
Fortunately, however, there is very little evidence to sup
port the theory which underlies the conventional wisdom. It
seems logical that the income gap between the United States
and the underdeveloped world should be the basic governor
of the immigration process. But that does not, in fact, seem
to be the case. The migrants are not coming from the poorest
countries in the world and they are not coming from the
poorest regions in their countries of origin. This remains true
even when some effort is made to correct the figures for the
cost of transportation or even information about job pro
spects. Mexican migrants to the United States, for example,
come from places like Jalisco in the middle of the country
and from Mexico City, not from the relatively poor Yucatan.
The poorest country in the Western Hemisphere is Haiti. It
has been the poorest for many, many years, but until quite
recently Haiti was not a principal source of migrant workers
and historically and to a lesser extent even now, the Haitian
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migration is primarily composed of the relatively well-to-do
and well-educated middle class.

Conventional Migration Theory Fails to Explain
Present and Past Rates of Immigration
Any theory of migration must explain its timing. The cur
rent wave of clandestine migration is recent. It dates from
the late 1960s. A large income differential between the
United States and the countries of origin has, however,
always existed and if anything has probably been narrowing
over the last ten years. Nor is it possible to account for the
recent migration flows through other changes in the cost dif
ferential. Transportation costs, for example, have been
remarkably stable over long periods of time. The cost of air
transportation from the Caribbean in the early 1970s (and
that's the period when immigration seems to have really
begun) is approximately the same percentage of the unskilled
worker's weekly wage as the cost of steamship passage from
Italy in the 1880s.
Insofar as I can judge from talking to immigrants, the im
migration process does not work as the conventional wisdom
presumes because the potential immigrants view the United
States much as Americans view the immigrants. The im
migrants are deeply attached to their language and culture
and strongly rooted in their own communities where they
feel comfortable and at home. They find American society
cold and alien, strange, lonely and frightening. Their migra
tion is thus not a sign of the special attraction of the United
States, but paradoxically of a commitment to their home
community. Generally, they have some particular project at
home which motivates the migration process: Landholdings
which they would like to expand or improve, agricultural
equipment or livestock they plan to purchase, an interurban
taxi or hack, a small store, in some areas a piece of industrial
equipment for a home factory. Their notion is to come to the
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United States temporarily, work hard for a relatively short
period of time, and then return home using the accumulated
earnings to finance their project. 2
This, incidently, is true not just of the current migration,
but it has been true historically as well. Late nineteenth cen
tury migrants from southern and eastern Europe seem to
have come from areas of small land holdings where projects
to expand or improve agriculture were widespread among
the peasantry. The rates of return or rate of emigration
among these early migrants were quite high, overall 32 per
cent of all immigrants between 1908 and 1910 (a period for
which we have complete figures) returned. 3 For some groups
the rate was much higher. Sixty-three percent of northern
Italian migrants to the United States and 56 percent of the
southern Italians, for example, went home in that period.
The fact that immigrants are motivated in this way limits the
range of jobs for which employers find them attractive.
They're not attractive for jobs to which adult national
workers normally aspire. Such jobs require a long-term com
mitment on the part of the labor force, high levels of educa
tion, training and experience, and a stable regular labor
force commitment.

The Secondary Labor Market
As an Explanation for Immigration
Thus, the immigration process tends to be governed by,
and respond to what we call the secondary sector of the labor
market jobs which are relatively low paying, insecure, have
menial social status, and lack any career advancement. Such
work is not attractive to committed national workers precise
ly because it has no future and adds little to the selfdefinition and esteem of those who perform it. The im
migrants are undeterred by these same characteristics
because they view their stay as temporary. They plan to leave
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before they are laid off. They do not think of themselves as
staying long enough to take advantage of career oppor
tunities and they obtain their self-definition from the work
they perform at home. Since it is the jobs in the secondary
sector for which migrants are an attractice source of labor, it
is these jobs which control the immigration process.
We do not know why the economy generates secondary
jobs. A good many of the jobs which clandestine immigrants
now hold were previously held by other migrant groups:
first, by foreign immigrants from southern and eastern
Europe and subsequently black workers migrating from the
rural south. The new immigration dates from the late 1960s
when unemployment, under the impact of the Vietnam War
boom, reached extremely low levels. In this period, the labor
reserves in the rural south were virtually exhausted and the
black labor force became dominated by a second generation
which had grown up in the cities. Case study evidence sug
gests that this new generation, whose attitudes were crystalized by the civil rights movement, were increasingly perceived
by employers as intractable and difficult, if not actually
dangerous, to manage. 4 Faced with a general labor shortage
and a great distrust of the existing workforce, businessmen
thus began to look around for new sources of labor and they
found them increasingly among foreign workers. In a
number of cases the employer's efforts seemed to have been
deliberate and purposeful, but they went largely unnoticed as
policy focused on obtaining higher levels of jobs for blacks.
In some cases businesses actually seemed to have recruited
from abroad, and this was the origin of the new migration
stream.
The character of an immigration stream does not,
however, remain static. It changes significantly over time.
Most early immigrants plan to stay only temporarily, but
many end up staying longer than they intended. Some of
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them eventually settle permanently in the United States.
Even those who finally do return often have children who
grow up in the United States, cut off from their parents'
country without the cultural and linguistic ties that bind their
parents to the place of origin. The long-stayers and their
children form a permanent settlement whose members,
especially in the second generation, have needs and aspira
tions which parallel those of the U.S. nationals. Indeed, for
practical purposes, many are U.S. nationals whatever their
legal status. Return is not a viable option.
Once a permanent community forms in the United States
the character of the new migrants also begins to change. It
becomes feasible to move to the United States and settle per
manently without experiencing the cultural alienation and
strangeness which deters this kind of migration in the begin
ning and more people begin to do so. Thus, an immigration
process which begins initially as essentially complementary
to the needs and aspiration of U.S. nationals generates over
time a second generation and a growing group of first
generation immigrants who are in competition with
American nationals for stable career jobs.
Where are we in this process at this time? If the recent
wave of immigration began in the late 1960s, it is now almost
20 years later. The country has accumulated a substantial
reserve of undocumented immigrants and the original fluid
immigration stream has begun to solidify. Most of the public
discussion seems to presume that this is the case. People talk
as if time alone makes this problem more and more pressing.
But here too, this is by no means clear. The initial upsurge of
immigration in the late 1960s was a response to two factors:
an unusually tight labor market with levels of unemployment
much lower than any experienced since, and a relatively sud
den shift in the character of the black labor force, who had
previously been staffing secondary jobs. The vacuum that
this created at the bottom of the labor market, into which the
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new immigrants were pulled, could not have been greatly ex
panded since that time and with rising unemployment may
actually have shrunk. In the last five years there has also
been a substantial infusion of refugees. The refugees have
moved into jobs very comparable to those held by un
documented migrants. But, the refugees have a permanent
commitment to the U.S. which the migrants do not and un
doubtedly push many of the migrants out. However settled
the original migrant communities have become, we know
from case studies and anecdotal evidence that the numbers
who are temporarily here, remain substantial. 3 Because these
people are here to save money they are not interested in
waiting out unemployment. They do not stay in the United
States. If jobs are unavailable they go home. Indeed, as one
migrant commented, "It is not worth my while to stay here if
I can't hold at least two jobs." At their core, the immigrant
communities may now be sufficiently solid to resist the
pressure of unemployment and the competition of the
refugees, but there is still a wide periphery of workers who
must have responded to the changing economic conditions
and the new competition by leaving the United States.
Economic troubles in Mexico are thought to be augment
ing undocumented migration, but this presumption is also
dubious. Nobody seems to have argued during the Mexican
oil boom of the late 1970s that the undocumented migration
from that country diminished. If the boom did not diminish
the migration, it is unclear why the bust should augment it.
However bad things are in Mexico, one can probably do bet
ter there surrounded by a family and embedded in a com
munity network than in the United States without a job and
ineligible for unemployment insurance or social welfare. In
any case, much of the argument applies to economic refugees
from Mexico, as it does to political refugees from Cuba,
Asia, and El Salvador. To the extent that they have a
stronger motive to stay in the United States, they're likely to
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replace temporary migrants from other countries in the
hemisphere. This displacement effect undoubtedly operates
least effectively in the West where Mexicans predominate,
but strongly in the Midwest and the East Coast where Mex
icans are only one of an immense number of different na
tional groups which make up the immigrant population.
Finally, what is almost never recognized in assessing the
evolution of the clandestine immigration population is that a
very large proportion of those people who do settle per
manently manage to legitimize their status. The official im
migration system in the United States operates through a
system of equity, or preference, to give enormous weight to
family reunification. The spouse, parents, and the children
under the age of 21 of U.S. citizens are admitted outside the
official immigration quotas. The preference system allocates
20 percent of the overall quota of 270,000 immigrants to un
married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens, 26 percent to
unmarried sons and daughters of permanent resident aliens,
10 percent to married sons and daughters of citizens and 24
percent to brothers and sisters of citizens. Very few people
develop a desire to settle permanently in an area without
developing the social and family ties which would eventually
qualify them for a permanent immigration visa under one or
another of these various family unification provisions. In ad
dition, the wives or husbands of U.S. citizens come in out
side the quota system altogether. Most visa violators come to
the United States as family visitors with exactly the kinds of
ties which would permit them to legitimize their status initial
ly. It is common practice for undocumented aliens to apply
for official admission, come to the United States, live and
work clandestinely while their application is pending, and
then return home when it comes through to pick it up at the
office. In this way, documented and undocumented migra
tion are intertwined and the pool of undocumented workers
is continually diminished by official migration.
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The estimates of the stock of undocumented migrants
have, as I said at the beginning, remained constant. That is,
the range has always been three to twelve million over the
whole course of this debate. It is generally supposed that this
is due to the width of the range and that the true figure has
moved up over time. Given rising unemployment, the com
petition of refugees, and the processes of legitimization
through official immigration, however, the true figure might
as well have actually declined. It is in the nature of this pro
cess that we can never know what the true figure is because,
obviously, clandestine migrants are not volunteering infor
mation about their presence in the United States.

Immigrant and Native Workers: Two Case Studies
What does this alternative view of immigration imply for
public policy? The major concern of public policymakers is
the threat which immigration poses to income and employ
ment opportunities of American nationals. In the conven
tional understanding, the immigrants constitute a generaliz
ed threat. In the process just sketched out, the threat is much
more limited and confined. The immigrants, at least in the
early stages of the process, do not threaten the employment
opportunities of permanent adult workers, particularly those
in jobs requiring a long-term career commitment. Indeed, in
sofar as a certain amount of menial, unskilled and unsecured
workers are necessary to sustain stable, long-term job oppor
tunities, the immigrants may actually complement these
types of national workers. The competition occurs between
the immigrants and other marginally committed labor force
groups, particularly youth and secondary women workers
whose primary commitment is to home and family respon
sibilities. Even that kind of competition is difficult to assess.
The nature of the labor force commitment of these groups is
in itself ambiguous. The jobs at stake are, moreover, in com-

34 International Migration

petition with foreign producers and any attempt to replace
the immigrant labor force with nationals might simply drive
the work abroad.
The difficulties for analysis and policy are illustrated by
two studies of New York City industries, one by Thomas
Baily (1985) of the New York City restaurant industry, the
second by Roger Waldinger (1985) of the New York City gar
ment industry.
The Restaurant Industry: In the restaurant industry, im
migrants tend to be concentrated in a distinct sector of ethnic
restaurants owned and managed by immigrant en
trepreneurs. This sector coexists with two other sectors the
fast food sector typified by McDonald's, which is staffed
primarily with young part-time workers, and full service
restaurants owned by American nationals who employ some
immigrants but also a certain number of nationals. Baily
argues, on the basis of a comparison with other cities which
have much smaller immigrant groups, that the competition
between immigrants and nationals is not a direct one, but oc
curs through the relative sizes of these different sectors.
Without the immigrants, he argues, the fast food sector
would be much larger, McDonald's would substitute for the
Greek coffee shop at the bottom of the price line, and limited
menu steakhouses would substitute at the top. This is partial
ly a substitution of youth for immigrant labor. However, a
good deal of the fast food operation is industrial. The food
and equipment are prepared in remote manufacturing
establishments. These establishments tend to offer relatively
unskilled jobs which are accessible to immigrants. These jobs
have schedules and locations which are not attractive to the
youth. The manufacturing activities can, moreover, be easily
performed abroad. Clearly, the jobs lost by immigrants
would not be converted to youth restaurant jobs on a onefor-one basis. It is not completely clear that youth could be
attracted to fill every new restaurant job created by curtail-
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ing immigration. The restaurants in the nonimmigrant cities
which Baily examined have a dispersed population and a
largely family clientele. They are located near the youth
which they employ. New York City restaurants have a pro
fessional and business clientele in the center city, remote
from the residence of young workers.
The Garment Industry: Employment patterns in the gar
ment industry are equally complicated and ambiguous.
Waldinger argues that the industry in New York also caters
to a particular segment of the national market. It concen
trates upon the production of short runs of specialty items
for a spot market. It therefore needs the large flexible
sources of labor which the immigrants provide. The im
migrant communities also provide a certain skill continuity
which is otherwise difficult to maintain and which is par
ticularly important given the type of production in which the
city specializes. Outside the city, production is of a very dif
ferent sort. It consists of much longer runs of the products
which are more standard and/or are ordered in advance. For
example, highly stylized dresses are produced in New York
City, while more standardized items such as blue jeans are
produced elsewhere in long-run operations. The first order
of standardized garments for the season will be produced
outside New York. But there will be last minute spot orders
which need to be filled on short notice. These are generally
produced in New York itself along with specialized orders.
The long-run type of production was originally done in New
York, but because it requires fewer skills, benefits from large
production facilities, and supports the time delays involved
in remote production, it moved out of the city during the
postwar decades, first to rural areas in the U.S., and then
abroad.
With the new immigration, some long-run production has
come back to New York City. It is difficult to imagine the
garment industry without a fashion center like New York
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and the spot market segment of the industry which resides
there. New York's chief American competitors are Miami
and Los Angeles, both of which use a similar immigrant
labor force. Without any immigrants the whole industry
might move abroad. The recent return of long-run produc
tion to New York City has been, at the expense, in part, of
farm wives in rural Pennsylvania, upstate New York, and the
south, and in this case the immigrants do compete with
American nationals. But it has also been at the expense of
foreign production, and the domestic production which
moved to New York might otherwise have moved to those
foreign locations. The significance of the jobs lost to the
farm wives is also debatable. Before the factories moved into
these areas, most of these women had never considered
working. The rural labor force was a creation of the
employers, in much the same way the immigration labor
force in the city is the product of employer recruiting.
To summarize, it is not clear that prohibiting the employ
ment of immigrants in these industries would necessarily in
crease employment of native workers. Immigrants readily
substitute for a marginally committed and less skilled labor
force. Employers appear reluctant to hire the mostly younger
and less skilled native workers. It is likely that reducing the
availability of foreign workers would only induce these
employers to relocate their firms abroad.

Policy Prescriptions
Taken together, these considerations lead me to conclude
that the concern which has motivated current legislative pro
posals is misplaced and the legislation itself is ill-conceived.
We ought, I would argue, nontheless, make an effort to limit
and control the immigration process. The reason for doing
so is that over a very long period of time immigration does
have the capacity to erode the employment opportunities of
national workers, and because generally, a tight labor
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market in which labor is in short supply is more conducive to
social progress than a loose one.
Limit Immigration by Improving Working Conditions:
The best way to limit immigration, however, is by direct con
trol over employment conditions, by raising wages and im
proving working conditions of the jobs to which immigrants
are attracted in the hope that this will eventually attract na
tional workers in their place. Policy instruments for doing
this are available in our labor standards legislation and the
National Labor Relations Act. I would, therefore, rather
devote the resources we are currently talking about diverting
to the enforcement of immigration legislation to enforce
ment of these pieces of labor legislation, and legislate
reforms which would raise the minimum wage, facilitate
union organization, tighten health and safety standards, and
the like. I prefer this policy to tighter immigration policy
because, in general, I think it is more humane more consis
tent with the preservation of and respect for human
rights to control jobs rather than to control people.
I also think that the immigration debate tends to become
entangled in feelings of xenophobia and racism, which
obscure the underlying economic interest at stake. As a
result, we are systematically led to pass legislation, which
when we see what its true economic costs are, we are unwill
ing to enforce. A debate which focuses on the minimum
wage and labor standards legislation makes these costs much
more salient in the public policy debate. I take it as axiomatic
that if we are unwilling to support legislation which directly
raises the cost of labor we will be unwilling to enforce im
migration legislation which has the effect of doing this in
directly by removing the foreign labor force. It is a consistent
part of this policy not only to enforce labor standards direct
ly, but also to combine that kind of enforcement with en
forcement of immigration legislation through periodic in-
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spection of establishments known to employ clandestine im
migrants so as to regularly vacate the jobs, open them up to
nationals and test their desirability. The decent way to do
this would be to inspect worker documents and inform the
employer of all employees without proper documents and to
hold the employer liable if he continues to hire these people
in the future.
Do Not Use Immigration Reform to Solve Basic Economic
and Social Problems: On the other hand, it would be a great
mistake to see in the control of immigration a solution to any
of our basic economic and social problems. This seems ob
vious to me with respect to the high levels of unemployment
we are currently experiencing, although, given the rhetoric
surrounding the policy debate, this point is perhaps worth
emphasizing. Current unemployment is the product of a
deep and prolonged economic recession combined with longterm structural adjustments in the technology and interna
tional competitive position of our major industries. The in
creases in unemployment have concentrated among precisely
those committed adult male workers who are not in competi
tion with immigrants. And the low-wage, unstable, menial
jobs which the immigrants hold will not substitute for the
jobs these people have lost. The immigrant jobs might, it is
true, ease the adjustment process of the displaced workers if
they were willing to take them, but few of the displaced
workers are going to be willing to accept the humiliation of
such a major decline in social status for the small income in
volved. The real solution to their problems will require both
an economic recovery that is sustained and long lasting and
training and relocation assistance to help permanently
displaced workers find a dignified place within the economy.
I think it is worth emphasizing that the immigrants only
accept these jobs because they think of them as temporary
and because they hold them in a place so remote from the
place in which they actually think of themselves as per-
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manently located and in which their own self-identity is an
chored. A similar point can be made with respect to black
youth. A number of the jobs now held by immigrants were
once held by the black nationals. If the immigrants were to
somehow disappear, black Americans would again take over
some of their work. The immigrants, however, did not
displace blacks. Employers perceived a change in black at
titudes toward the work which made them difficult to
manage, and recruited migrants to replace them. Black at
titudes changed because an older generation, raised in the
rural south with a background and motivations similar to the
immigrants of today, was replaced by a new generation who
grew up in northern urban areas. These younger workers
associated the jobs with the inferior social status to which
their race had been condemned in the United States and
feared that they would be confined in them permanently
through prejudice and discrimination. This process of
replacement occurred almost 20 years ago in a much tighter
labor market and at a time when both the political climate
and the levels of welfare and social benefits were much more
conducive to these attitudes than they are today. It is likely
that black resistance to such work has moderated somewhat
and this is the case for pressing to reopen some of these jobs.
But, neither I nor, more important, the businessmen involv
ed believe that the attitudes have changed substantially. The
real solution to the employment problem of blacks requires
not the regaining of menial, low-wage jobs, but upward
mobility into high-wage, dignified work.
Do Not Interfere Directly with the Settlement of Im
migrant Communities: Finally, precisely because of the ex
perience with the black revolt in the 1960s, it would be a
great mistake to attempt to control immigration by directly
forestalling settlement. The black movement was essentially
the revolt of second generation immigrants a revolt of the
children of a generation who had come out of the south who
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were no longer satisfied with their parents' jobs, but who did
not have access to the high wages and career advancement
which might have satisfied their aspirations. Prejudice and
discrimination were undoubtedly major factors blocking
their advancement, but the black youth of the 1960s were
also poorly trained for the positions to which they aspired.
The children of the new immigrants will undoubtedly view
their parents' jobs in much the same way and may react in
much the same way if their own advancement is similarly
blocked. Any attempt to prevent their parents from settling
permanently will bar the children access to the educational
and cultural facilities which will enable them to fulfill their
aspirations and recreate for another major portion of our
population the social tensions which have surrounded black
communities in the last 20 years.
In a sense, moreover, American society has a moral
obligation to these children as well. They are here because we
wanted the labor of their parents. In a very real sense, we
recruited their parents. By so doing we made the children like
us, probably more like us in terms of values and aspirations,
culture and language, than their parents. Having done so, we
have an obligation to treat them as we would treat our own
children. If, in the process, we create competitors for our
children, this may be an argument for more careful control
of the use of immigrant labor in the secondary sector, but is
is not a very strong argument for limiting the after effects of
that immigration by pressing on the children who, like us,
have nowhere else to go.

Conclusions
Rejection of the conventional policy alternatives need not
imply that we accept the settlement of immigrants as in
evitable and beyond our control. To the contrary, the im
migration process can be limited by a variety of means.
Higher wages in the secondary sector would attract nationals
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to jobs generally held by immigrants and thus make un
necessary the active recruitment of workers from abroad.
Demand for immigrants on the part of employers is an im
portant explanation for the continued stock of un
documented workers. Furthermore, increased wages would
enable temporary immigrants to meet their target earnings
more rapidly and return home before they develop perma
nent attachments in the United States. The longer the
residence of the immigrant the more likely he or she will
develop attachments and hence the more likely temporary
residency will become permanent.
Changing the current visa policy may reduce permanent
immigration. Time limitations on visitors in the form of
visas, paradoxically, encourage longer stays and cause many
visitors to remain permanently, albeit illegally, in the United
States. This results because visa violators delay returning
home when their visas expire for fear they will not be permit
ted entry into the United States again. Replacing temporary
visas with permanent visas could reduce permanent settle
ment by permitting visitors to return home without fear of
being barred from entering the United States in the future.
Higher wages and altered visa policies are all a good deal
more humane and less costly than the policies contemplated
in the current legislative debate. I believe these will ultimate
ly be more effective in preserving the economic and spiritual
values of American life.

NOTES
1. For a discussion about the derivation of these estimates see Corwin
(1984).
2. For extensive discussion about the motives of immigrants see Piore
(1979).
3. Immigration Commission (1911), p. 182, Table 16.
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4. For a discussion about these perceptions see Piore (1969).
5. For a discussion and citations see Piore (1979).
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The Imperative
of Immigration Reform
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Cornell University

"Its death is a classic symptom of the problem with our
politics; the special interest prevails over the general
interest." 1 With this epitaph, one member of the congres
sional conference committee summed up the fate of the im
migration reform package that died within his committee in
October 1984. The bill under consideration was popularly
known as the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. It represented the latest
unsuccessful effort by Congress of a quest that began in the
early 1970s to come to grips with the nation's outmoded and
out-of-control immigration system. 2
The Simpson-Mazzoli bill was not a panacea for the na
tion's immigration ills. It represented only the first step of
what eventually must be a series of legislative moves to
assure that the immigration system contributes to the
nation's economic welfare and does not contravene such
goals. For although the Simpson-Mazzoli bill did contain
other features, it primarily addressed illegal immigration. As
important as is this issue, it is a fundamental mistake to
assume that abuse of the existing system is the only problem
with the nation's immigration system. To the contrary, the
nation's immigration system is in need of a complete
overhaul. Massive illegal immigration is only the most ob
vious symptom that something is wrong.
It was the original intention of this paper to discuss why
the Simpson-Mazzoli bill was only the first and not the final
43
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step in the immigration reform process. The defeat of this
bill which, incidentally, the noted authority on immigra
tion history, Oscar Handlin, has correctly called "a more
liberal measure than any we've had in 90 years" 3 means
that the reform movement is back to square one. Hence, it is
not yet possible to speak only about the agenda that lies
"beyond Simpson-Mazzoli." The whole issue of immigra
tion reform still remains to be again addressed.

The Issue in Brief Perspective
There are only two ways for a nation to acquire its labor
force: people are born within its boundaries or they im
migrate from other nations. Throughout most of the 19th
and early 20th centuries, immigration was the most impor
tant component of the nation's human resource policy. The
imposition of the nation's first numerical ceilings on im
migration in the 1920s was followed by several decades of
depression, war, and their immediate aftermaths. As a con
sequence, immigration diminished significantly in terms of
its human resource importance from the early 1920s to the
early 1960s. Because of this diminished role over this forty
year period, many scholars and policymakers have been slow
to recognize that since the mid-1960s, immigration in all of
its diverse forms has again become a major feature of the
U.S. economy. The 1980 Census revealed that since 1970, the
number of foreign-born Americans had increased sharply
after declining each previous decade since 1920 and it
disclosed that one of every 10 people in the country reported
speaking a language other than English at home. As there
was a substantial statistical undercount of the illegal im
migration population, it is certain that the dramatic findings
of the size of the foreign-born population in 1980 are
significantly understated. Noting the developments, Leon
Bouvier observed in 1981 that "immigration now appears to
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be almost as important as fertility insofar as U.S. population
growth is concerned." 4 As the labor force is the principal
means by which population changes are transmitted to the
nation's economy, Bouvier warned that "there is a compell
ing argument for close co-ordination between the formula
tion of employment and immigration policy." 5 Recognition
of this critical linkage is the basis for the drive for immigra
tion reform in the 1980s.

The Ability of Policy to Affect
Labor Force Trends
The preponderance of factors that influence labor force
trends within an economy are beyond the realm of
policymakers to influence, even if they want to do so. Labor
market research has repeatedly shown, for instance, that
race and gender can influence employment and income ex
periences of the labor force. As the number and proportion
of minorities and women have increased in the labor force,
there is nothing that human resource policymakers can do to
change these trends. They can only respond with adjustment
policies designed to influence the factors that cause these
outcome differentials to occur. The same can be said for
demographic changes in the age distribution of the labor
force, the shift in social values that have contributed to the
dramatic increase in female labor force participation, or the
effects of the pace and scope of technological change on the
preparation of workers for jobs. The control of immigration
flows, however, is considered to be an exercise in the use of
the discretionary powers of the state. As such, it is one
dimension of a nation's human resource policy that should
be capable of directive action rather than forced reaction.
Immigration has economic implications for the par
ticipants and for the receiving society. It can determine labor
force trends as well as respond to them. For this reason, the
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efficacy of policies that regulate immigration must be judged
in terms of how they have related to broader labor force
trends at any particular time. As will soon be apparent, this
is decidedly not the case in the United States as of the
mid-1980s.

The Influence of Administrative Structure
Because the magnitude and composition of immigration
flows are supposedly subject to direct regulation by human
institutions, it is essential to understand how the policymaking process functions. There is only tangential mention of
immigration in the Constitution. By the late nineteenth cen
tury, however, the Supreme Court had concluded that the
federal government was the exclusive governmental body to
assume this responsibility. 6 After a brief assignment of
power to the Department of the Treasury and later to the
Department of Commerce and Labor, the administration of
immigration policy was shifted to the newly established U.S.
Department of Labor (DOL) in 1914. This action
represented a clear recognition by policymakers of the time
that labor market considerations should be a primary con
cern in the administration of immigration policy. In 1933, by
executive order, the immigration and the naturalization
functions (which had been separately administered in DOL)
were joined into one agency the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS). The INS has continued every
since to be responsible for the implementation of immigra
tion policy.
With the recognition in 1940 of the likely involvement of
the United States in World War II, a critical decision was
made that has had lasting influence on the course of im
migration policy. In June 1940, the INS was shifted from
DOL to the U.S. Department of Justice. Ostensibly, the shift
was necessary for national security reasons. It was believed
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that rapidly changing international events dictated a more ef
fective means of control over immigrants and nonim
migrants. Concern over the entry and presence of subversive
foreign elements in the population was elevated to the
highest priority mission of the agency. Labor market con
siderations the historic concern were shunted aside.
When the war ended, the INS remained in the Department
of Justice. The long-run effects of this administrative change
have been disastrous to efforts to build a coherent immigra
tion policy especially if one of the concerns is that im
migration policy should be congruent with domestic labor
force trends. The Department of Justice has multiple respon
sibilities and, when compared to its numerous other impor
tant duties, immigration matters have tended to be neglected
or relegated to a low order of priority. Moreover, the
Department of Justice is one of the most politically sensitive
agencies in the federal government. It has often opted for the
short-run expedient solutions for immigration issues. It has
seldom manifested any interest in the economic aspects and
consequences of immigration.
Another lasting effect of the shift of immigration policy to
the Justice Department has been that the two judiciary com
mittees of Congress gained the responsibility for supervision
over immigration in general and the INS in particular. Tradi
tionally, membership on these committees has been reserved
(often exclusively) for lawyers. The result, as noted by David
North and Alien LeBel, is that "as immigration problems
arise, be they major or minor, perceived or real, the response
of lawyer-legislators is that the law should be changed." 7 As
a consequence, immigration law in the United States has
become extremely complex and legalistic. In addition to
these laws, it is also the case that INS operations are govern
ed by more than 5,000 pages of written rules. Over the years,
the labor market implications of immigration policy have
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either been ignored or given only superficial attention by the
INS.

The Nature of the Existing Immigration System
Before discussing the reform of the extant immigration
system, it is necessary to outline briefly what is the current
system. To do this, it is necessary to look at the major policy
components those that pertain to legal immigration,
refugees, asylees, and illegal immigration. For the sake of
brevity, I am not going to discuss the complex topics of
nonimmigrant labor policy or of border commuter labor
policy which are also part of this system and are also in dire
need of reform.

Legal Immigration Policy
The revival of legal immigration as an influential force can
be virtually dated to the passage of the Immigration Act of
1965. It represented the culmination of decades of efforts to
purge the nation's immigration system of the overt racism
that had been the central focus of the "national origins
system" adopted in 1924. After years of active struggle, the
Civil Rights movement achieved its capstone goal the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Just as overt racism
could not longer be tolerated in the way citizens were treated
by fellow citizens, neither could racism be practiced by the
laws that govern the way in which noncitizens were con
sidered for immigrant admission.
The restrictive features of the "national origins system"
had done more than shape the racial and ethnic composition
of immigrant flows. It had sharply distorted the total flow of
immigrants. Some nations with large quotas (e.g., Great Bri
tain, which was entitled to about 40 percent of all of the
available visas) did not use all of the slots available to it while
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other nations with small quotas (e.g., Italy and Greece) had
massive backlogs of would-be immigrants. Hence, during
the years 1952 to 1965, for example, only 61 percent of the
available quotas were actually used, despite the fact that tens
of thousands of persons were precluded from admission
because they came from the "wrong" country. Succeeding
administrations in the post-World War II era were forced,
therefore, to seek ad hoc legislation and to use parole powers
given to the Attorney General to admit hundreds of
thousands of refugees for both humanitarian and national
interest considerations. As a consequence, one of every three
persons admitted to the United States from 1952 to 1965
entered outside the terms of the prevailing immigration
system. Hence, because the system was outdated by the pro
gression of both world and domestic events, the Immigration
Act of 1965 was adopted.
It is important to note that while the changes enacted in
1965 significantly altered the character of the existing
system, the reform movement could not entirely escape the
heavy hand of the past. Thus, while overt racism was
eliminated in 1965, the new act elevated family reunification
to the role of being the dominant admission factor. On the
surface this might seem to be a humane feature, but the
motivation for the change was far less noble. The change was
made in the judiciary committee of the House of Represen
tatives where some congressional supporters were more con
cerned with finding a way to retain the national origins
system under a covert guise. Obviously, if certain groups had
been excluded or had a low quota in the past, they would
have had fewer chances to have relatives who could use their
presence as a means to admit new immigrants. Thus, reliance
on family unification would largely benefit those groups who
had large quotas under the older system. The Johnson ad
ministration opposed this move. It sought to retain both the
priority and the emphasis of labor market considerations as
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the highest preference criterion (which had been the case
since the use of a preference system to determine immigrant
priorities was formally established in 1952). Congress,
however, made family reunification the dominant admission
factor. The Johnson administration was forced to accept the
change as the price of getting rid of the national origins ad
mission system. Labor market considerations were
downgraded to both lower preferences and to a sharply
reduced number of visa allotments. The ostensible reasons
for the reversal or priorities was that during the era when
labor market factors dominated, the system had not used all
of the available slots. But as already noted, the reason for
the inability to use all of the available slots between 1952-65
was the distortion imposed by the "national origins
system" not the concept of labor force priority itself.
In the years since 1965, there have been a number of minor
changes in the immigration system but they have retained
this focus on family reunification. The system as of early
1984 sets a single worldwide admission ceiling of 270,000
visas to be issued each year. No more than 20,000 visas are to
be allotted to the would-be immigrants of any one country.
The "immediate relatives" of each visa holder, however, are
not counted in either ceiling. Immediate relatives are
spouses, children, and parents of U.S. citizens over age 21.
To decide which specific individuals are to be granted such a
visa within the framework of these numerical ceilings, a sixcategory preference system exists. The categories rank the
preferences in order with a certain proportion of the total
visas reserved for each preference. Four of the categories
(which account for 80 percent of the visas) are reserved for
persons who are family-related. Thus, family reunification
has, since 1965, become the mainstay of the legal immigra
tion system. The two remaining admission categories are
based on labor market principles. They account for the re
maining 20 percent of the available visas each year. For these
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two labor market categories, a person must secure a cer
tification from the Department of Labor that states that the
presence of the immigrant will not adversely affect the job
opportunities and prevailing labor force standards of citizen
workers. In addition to the preference categories, Congress
has established 33 separate classes of people who are
specifically excluded from being admitted (e.g., paupers,
prostitutes, Nazis, communists, fascists, homosexuals, etc.)
no matter if they would otherwise be eligible to be an im
migrant.
It should also be noted that between 1965 and 1980, a
separate preference group existed for refugees with 17,400
slots. Over that interval, however, the actual number of
refugee admissions greatly exceeded this ceiling. (Excluding
Vietnamese refugees, it averaged about 50,000 persons a
year.) The excesses were admitted through the use of the
parole authority given to the Attorney General to admit per
sons for "emergent reasons." Because the use of the parole
powers was finally admitted to be what it was a means of
circumventing the existing immigration statutes, refugees
were removed from the established immigration system in
1980. With the Refugee Act of 1980, they are admitted under
a separate procedure. Since 1982, the President arbitrarily
sets the number of refugees to be admitted in advance of
each fiscal year. He then must consult with Congress over
the appropriateness of the suggested figure. The number of
refugees approved for 1984, for instance, was 72,000 per
sons. Obviously, there are no labor market considerations
applied to the entry eligibility of refugees.
The Refugee Act of 1980 also created an asylee policy for
the United States. As opposed to a refugee (who is a person
living outside of his or her home nation and who fears
persecution if forced to return but who is not presently in the
United States), an asylee is a person who also fears similar
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persecution if he or she returns to his or her homeland but is
already physically present in the United States. The Refugee
Act of 1980 authorized up to 5,000 asylee admissions a year.
As of early 1984, there were over 173,000 asylee requests
pending approval and it is likely that this number will con
tinue to grow. As with refugees, there are no labor market
considerations applied to asylees.
Having discussed the "front door" approaches to the na
tions labor market, it is necessary to add that there is a
massive "back door" approach as well. Although the legal
system is extremely complex in its objectives, the entire
system can be easily circumvented by those who enter illegal
ly. Unlike most other nations, there are no penalties on
employers who hire illegal immigrants in the United States.
Virtually all illegal immigrants who are caught are given a
"voluntary departure" back to their homeland. Hence, there
is virtually no deterrence associated with the violation of the
existing system. There is no system of work permits or of na
tional identification and those forms of identification that
are available are easily counterfeitable. Moreover, the INS
has always been chronically understaffed and underfunded
relative to the duties it is assigned.
All evidence indicates that most illegal immigrants come to
the United States to find jobs not for purposes of securing
welfare or for criminal purposes. No one, of course, knows
the exact number of illegal immigrants who compose the
stock of the illegal immigrant population or the annual flow.
In its final report in 1981, the Select Commission on Im
migration and Refugee Policy cited a range of from 3.5 to 6
million illegal immigrants. Their estimate, however, was bas
ed upon a review provided by the Census Bureau of a variety
of previous studies done in the early and mid-1970s. Thus,
whatever the validity of the estimate included in the Select
Commission's report, it should be understood that it was
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based on the averaging of data for the mid-1970s not the
mid-1980s. Given the certainty that illegal immigration has
increased since the mid-1970s, the stock and flows are no
doubt greater now than those cited by the Commission's
Report. In 1984, the INS apprehended 1,056,905 illegal im
migrants. Many of these people were apprehended more
than once. On the other hand, however, most illegal im
migrants especially those from countries other than Mex
ico are never caught. Hence, the magnitude of the stock
and annual flows of illegal immigrants cannot be estimated
with any degree of accuracy.

Labor Market Impacts of the Era
of Renewed Immigration
There is a paucity of credible research on the precise
employment experiences of all groups of post-1965 im
migrants. There is no statistical data base to measure the
labor force status of immigrants comparable to the informa
tion compiled by the monthly Current Population Survey for
all workers in the United States. All that are available are ad
ministrative statistics the findings of a few ad hoc studies
of immigrants, and information on the foreign-born popula
tion supplied by the decennial census count. From these
disparate sources, however, it is possible to discern some
likely tendencies. An awareness of these tendencies and their
logical conclusions is prerequisite to an understanding of the
macro-economic effects of immigrantion to the nation.

The Immigrant Infusion to the Supply
of Labor Has Increased
The annual flow of legal immigrants since 1965 has more
than doubled the annual flow that existed for the period 1924
to 1965. For the earlier period, the annual flow was 191,000
immigrants and immediate relatives; for the period 1965 to
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1981, the number has increased to an annual average of
435,000; for the years 1978 to 1981, it was 547,000. These
figures do not include those refugees who have yet to adjust
their status to become resident aliens, or those asylees whose
status is still pending, or any illegal immigrants. If all flows
are considered, it is likely that immigration in the 1980s is ac
counting for as much as half of the annual growth in the
population and probably an even greater percentage of the
real growth of the labor force. 8

The Size of the Annual Flow of Immigrants Has No Regard
for Domestic Labor Market Conditions
The aggregate number of immigrants and immediate
relatives admitted each year is completely independent of the
prevailing labor market conditions. The number of im
migrants annually admitted has in no way been influenced by
the tightness or looseness of the domestic labor market. If
allowance is also made for refugees admitted since 1965 and
for the tide of illegal immigrants that have entered over this
same period, immigration has steadily added substantial
numbers of additional workers, regardless of the cyclical
ability of the economy to provide sufficient jobs for citizen
or immigrant workers. This practice is at total variance with
the practice of most of the handful of other countries that
have been admitting immigrants over this same period.
Immigrants Have a Higher
Labor Force Participation Rate
The few studies that have focused upon labor force par
ticipation of immigrants reveal that the majority of im
migrants over age 16 do enter the labor force. Indeed, they
show that the actual labor force participation rate for legal
immigrants and their immediate relative is likely to be con
siderably not marginally higher than that of the general
population. 9
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There is no such data, of course, for illegal immigrants but
it is intuitively obvious that their labor force participation
rates are higher than those of legal immigrants. Illegal im
migrants are primarily job seekers. They are legislatively in
eligible for many of the transfer programs that might pro
vide alternative income sources. The case with refugees,
however, is not quite so clear. Refugees prior to the 1970s
seem to have had a relatively easier adjustment process to
labor force entry than have large infusions of refugees from
Southeast Asia that have occurred since the mid-1970s.
Refugees have been eligible not only for federal income
transfer programs but also for local and state programs that
are available to citizens.

Immigration Supplies Workers Independent of the
Macro Human Resource Needs of the Economy
An overwhelming proportion of those persons who have
immigrated to the United States have been admitted without
regard to their skill, education, or geographic settlement
preferences. As noted earlier, 80 percent of the persons who
receive visas to immigrate are admitted because the immigra
tion system gives preference to family reunification prin
ciples. Immediate relatives of all immigrants are admitted
regardless of their labor force credentials, as are all refugees
and all would-be asylees. This is not meant to imply that
those who are admitted under these procedures lack talents
but rather, as David North and Alien LeBel have observed,
they "do so accidently." 10 Accordingly it is estimated that
only about 5 percent of all those persons admitted to the
United States each year are required to have labor certifica
tions that indicate they are filling established labor force
needs. If illegal immigrants are included, of course, this
small percentage of certified workers would be reduced to an
infinitesimal number compared to the total flow of im
migrant workers.
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The Immigrant Flow is Predominately Composed
of Members of Minority Groups
The most important qualitative change in the personal
characteristics of immigrants that has occurred since the end
of the national origins system has been the complete shift in
the regions of origin of the immigrants. Almost 80 percent of
the immigrants and refugees admitted during the 1970s were
from Latin America and Asia. In the 1980s, the percentage is
even higher (close to 84 percent). Beginning with the decade
of the 1960s, Europe was replaced for the first time in the na
tion's history by Latin America as the leading source of im
migrants. By the 1970s, Asia which was not free from the
discriminatory features of the previous immigration system,
was challenging Latin America for that distinction.
The last time that a European nation was among the top
five of the countries that supply immigrants to the United
States was in 1973 (when Italy placed fifth). Mexico has
become the country that annually supplies the most im
migrants; the Philippine Islands have tended to be the
runner-up. The other sources vary from year to year but,
since 1974, they have all been located in either Asia or the
Caribbean area.
The predominance of immigrants from Latin America and
the Caribbean area can be easily explained in terms of the
priority given to family reunification in the admissions
system. For Asians, the explanation is more complex. It
would seem that the family reunification system should have
worked against many Asian groups, given the exclusionary
features that were in effect for much of the pre-1965 era. The
answer to this paradox is the fact that Asians have made
astute use of the occupational preferences as well as the fact
that they have overwhelmingly dominated the massive
refugee flows for each year since the mid-1970s. In the first
case, the Asian immigrants have tended to be skilled and
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highly educated; in the latter instance, they have usually been
unskilled and poorly educated.
Likewise, the illegal immigrant flows have also come
predominately from Mexico and the Caribbean area. The
best approximations are that about 60 percent of the illegal
immigrants to the United States come from Mexico and
about 20 percent come from other countries of the Carib
bean area. The remaining 20 percent come from other na
tions of the world.
Without doubt, therefore, the combined immigrant flows
are overwhelmingly composed of persons from minority
groups (Hispanics, blacks, and Asians). As will be discussed
later, there is a strong clustering pattern of these immigrants
into local labor markets of the central cities of a few large
states that are already composed of persons from similar
racial and ethnic backgrounds. As a result, it is very likely
that many immigrants compete directly with other citizen
minority workers for available jobs. The competition is most
likely to be most adverse in the lower skilled occupations.
For the higher skilled legal immigrants, the competition for
employment opportunities is more broadly based and,
accordingly, the impact is less severe.
It is likely, therefore, that since 1965, immigration in
general but illegal immigration and refugee flows in par
ticular has tended to adversely affect the employment,
unemployment and labor force participation rates of minori
ty citizens. The geographical concentration of immigrants in
a few large metropolitan areas has also tended to moderate
wage increases for all workers who compete with them in
these same labor markets in general but with minority group
citizens in particular.'' To the degree this has happened, un
controlled immigration has worked at cross purposes with
other federal human resource policies that have been in
itiated over these same years that have been designed prin-
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cipally to improve the economic opportunity for these same
minority citizen groups.

The Occupational Patterns of Immigrants Differ
Extensively From Those of the Labor Force as a Whole
With specific reference to the occupational patterns of im
migrants, the occupational distribution of those admitted as
legal immigrants is skewed toward professional, technical,
and skilled workers. The pattern is due largely to the fact
that the complex admission system is biased toward those
who have family connections as well as the time and the
money that it takes to work their way through the labyrinth
of the legal immigration system. For the minority who are
admitted under the two occupational preferences and who,
by virtual definition do not have family relatives who are
citizens, the two occupational preferences generally favor
those with high skills and extensive educational
backgrounds. Persons who are likely to become "public
charges," for instance, are specifically excluded from
becoming legal immigrants. Furthermore, because of the ex
tensive backlog of visa applications (over 1.2 million visa ap
plications were pending at the end of 1982), there have been
no visas available since 1978 for the nonpreference "catch
all" category that theoretically exists. Thus, it is not surpris
ing that the occupational characteristics are skewed dif
ferently from the distribution of the labor force as a whole.
It appears from studies by David North of a cohort of
1970 immigrants and a study by Barry Chiswick of the
foreign-born who entered the U.S. up to 1970, that the earn
ings of immigrants tend to be initially below those of citizen
workers in comparable occupations but that these dif
ferences gradually vanish in 11 to 15 years. 12 Chiswick, in
fact, found that male immigrants actually end up doing bet
ter than citizen workers in comparable occupations after
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about 20 years in the country. He was unable to make con
clusive findings about female immigrants. It is of conse
quence to note that Chiswick found that immigrants from
Mexico and the Philippines (the two countries that have been
the largest sources of legal immigrants since 1962) took a
longer time to sustain these results.
In reviewing, Chiswick's ambitious research on this sub
ject, it is vital to keep in mind that his analysis is of all
foreign-born who had entered the United States prior to
1970. It has been after 1970, however, that the full effects of
the Immigration Act of 1965 and the Refugee Act of 1980
have occurred. As North has noted, the 1970 Census data on
the foreign-born "is a group composed of persons of above
average age, most of whom came to the U.S. many years
earlier and under provisions of earlier legislation." 13 As a
consequence he warns about the use of this data as a
reference group since "one must not assume that the profile
of the foreign-born which emerged from the 1970 Census
will be similar to that emerging from the 1980 or 1990 Cen
suses.'
Likewise, the sizeable increases in the number of illegal
immigrants since the 1960s especially those from Mexico
and the Caribbean Basin have been dominated by lowskilled and unskilled workers, which also challenges any
complacent deductions that would seem to be the logical
conclusions of some of the existing literature. In Chiswick's
work, for instance, there is no way to separate the experience
of legal immigrants from illegal immigrants since he is study
ing the foreign-born as reported by the Census. It is certain
that the illegal immigrant population is severely undercounted in the Census and, accordingly, it is likely that their
experiences are not adequately captured by this data base.
One study that has made use of the 1980 Census and its
data on the foreign-born, done by Gregory DeFreitas and

60 Immigration Reform

Adriana Marshall found that over one-third of all im
migrants were employed in manufacturing (compared to 23
percent of native-born workers). 15 In many metropolitan
areas, the concentration was more severe 75 percent of all
manufacturing workers in Miami were immigrants; over 40
percent of those in Los Angeles and New York City; 25 per
cent in San Francisco; and 20 percent in Chicago and
Boston. In 35 metropolitan areas with a population of one
million or more, immigrants comprised 19 percent of all pro
duction jobs in manufacturing. Not surprisingly, given the
occupational, industrial and geographic concentration of the
immigrant work force, the study found that the rate of wage
growth in manufacturing was inversely related to the size of
the immigrant population in those metropolitan areas. The
high concentration of foreign-born workers had a statistical
ly significant negative impact on wage growth compared to
the experience with large metropolitan areas with lower
percentages of foreign-born workers.
Given that the illegal immigrant flows into the labor force
since 1965 are likely to have matched and probably exceeded
the legal flows, it is essential that the labor market ex
periences of illegal immigrants be specifically included in any
effort to assess the overall impact of immigrants on the labor
market. There are only two studies that have been able to
make a serious attempt to capture some measure of these
patterns. One was a nationwide study made of apprehended
illegal immigrants by David North and Marion Houstoun in
1976. 16 The second was a study made of unapprehended il
legal immigrants in Los Angeles in 1979 by a research team
from the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). 17
Both studies were funded by the U.S. Department of Labor.
In the North and Houstoun study, the respondents had been
in the United States for an average of 2.5 years while in the
UCLA study the mean was 4.0 years.
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The occupational patterns of the respondents in the two
studies showed conclusively that illegal immigrants are con
centrated in the unskilled occupations of farm workers, ser
vice workers, nonfarm laborers as well as the semi-skilled
blue-collar occupations of operatives. A significant number
are also in the skilled blue-collar occupation of craft
workers. Very few were found in any white-collar occupa
tion.
A comparison of the data from these two studies shows
that the occupational patterns of illegal immigrants closely
resembles those of Mexican Americans (Chicanos) and of
blacks. The employment pattern of Chicanos, in fact, better
resembles the pattern of illegal immigrants than it does the
general distribution pattern of the overall labor force.
It seems certain that the illegal immigrant workers are con
centrated in the secondary labor market of the U.S. economy
where they often compete with the millions of citizen
workers who also are working and seek work in this sector.
Indeed, Malcolm Lovell, the Under Secretary of Labor, in
his testimony to Congress in support of immigration reform,
stated that "in 1981, close to 30 percent of all workers
employed in this country, some 29 million people, were
holding down the same kind of low-skilled industrial, ser
vice, and farm jobs in which illegals typically find employ
ment." 18
Illegal immigrants are by no means the only cause of
unemployment and persistent low income patterns among
certain subgroups of the American labor force but they cer
tainly are one factor. The formulation of any serious full
employment strategy for the United States in the 1980s,
therefore, will have to include measures to curtail illegal im
migration.
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Thus, it would appear that the occupational impact of
legal immigrants is at the upper end of the nation's occupa
tional structure while the impact of illegal immigrants is at
the lower end. Studies that combine these two groups to ob
tain an average measure of the experience of immigrants on
the labor force miss the actual significance of the real im
pact.

The Locational Impact of Immigrants
is Extremely Unequal
One of the most pronounced effects of the unguided im
migration system is that legal immigrants are highly concen
trated into a relatively few major labor markets. Since 1966,
California and New York have consistently accounted for
almost half of the intended residences of all legal im
migrants. Texas, Florida, New Jersey and Illinois account
for about one-quarter of the intended settlement destina
tions. Thus, six states have received almost three-quarters of
all of the legal immigrants. Data from the 1980 Census also
confirm this high concentration rate of the total foreignborn population in these same states (the percentage of
foreign-born in California was 14.8 percent, New York 13.4
percent, New Jersey 10.3, Florida 10.9, Illinois 7.3 and
Texas 6.0; the only other state with a large foreign-born
population was Hawaii with 14.0 percent). 19
Within the states in which they settle, legal immigrants
have demonstrated a consistent preference in the 1970s for
the large central cities. 20 Although the exact percentage
varies each year, a central city was the destination of about
55 percent of the immigrants who were admitted between
1960 and 1979. Urban areas those with a population of be
tween 2,500 to 99,000 people were the clear second choices
while rural areas were a distant last. These initial residential
patterns differ distinctly from those of the general popula-
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tion in which urban areas have become the overwhelming
first choice since 1960 (accounting for almost half of the
population) followed by an almost equal preference (of
about 25 percent each) for central cities and rural areas.
The 1980 Census information on the foreign-born popula
tion vividly demonstrates the effect that immigration is hav
ing on the population of a few large metropolitan areas. In
1980, for instance, the metropolitan area with the highest
percentage of its population being foreign-born was Miami,
with a phenomenal percentage of 35.2 percent. The second
highest was Los Angeles (21.6 percent) and the third was
New York City (20.8 percent). Thus, the necessity to accom
modate the growing immigrant flow has not fallen evenly.
Only a few states and a handful of cities have borne the
brunt of the revival of immigration that has occurred since
1965. As the aforementioned DeFreitas and Marshall study
found, one effect of the disproportionate concentrations has
been to retard wage growth in these large metropolitan areas
relative to other metropolitan areas with fewer immigrant
workers. It is also of consequence to note that the settlement
pattern of illegal immigrants has closely resembled the locational preferences of legal immigrants. In their quest to
avoid detection, illegal immigrants often seek to blend into
communities that already have large numbers of persons
from similar ethnic backgrounds. This tendency, of course,
only intensifies the pressures on these few states and cities to
accommodate immigrants.
Thus, the uneven distribution of immigrants means that
studies that focus on the national or state level miss the ac
tual impact of immigration at the local level in the com
munities of only a handful of states. But when one
recognizes that those central cities in these few states account
for a significant portion of the total employment in the na
tion, there is no reason to consider these impacts as inconse
quential to the economy as a whole.

64 Immigration Reform

In the Short Run, It is Likely that Immigrants
Contribute to Higher Unemployment Rates
Chiswick has found for the foreign-born males that it
takes about five years for them to reach the same number of
weeks worked and to come down to the same number of
weeks of unemployment as native-born men. 21 This would
suggest that in the short run that immigrant males tend to ex
perience a higher incidence of unemployment than is the
general case. In his findings, it is also of importance to note
that he also found that the foreign-born males from Mexico,
Cuba, and China tended to take longer to reach parity with
native-born men than it did the foreign-born men from other
nations. All three of these countries have consistently ranked
among the largest sources of legal immigrants and refugees
since 1970. It is logical to conclude that, if anything, the
unemployment experiences of the past decade should be less
favorable than those that occurred prior to the 1970s.

Concluding Observations
The prevailing immigration policy of the United States
was largely conceived in the early 1950s and the mid-1960s
when immigration was not a particularly significant in
fluence on the economy of the nation. As a consequence, the
current immigration policy manifests a complete disinterest
in its labor force implications. Perhaps the nation could con
tinue to allow immigration policy to be excluded from any
responsibility to contribute directly to the nation's economic
welfare if the economy had not undergone significant
changes and if the immigration flows of workers had remain
ed relatively small. But this has not been the case. Hence, the
"practice" of allowing immigration policy to continue to
follow its own nepotistic, inflexible, mechanistic, and
massively abused course is a "luxury" that this nation can ill
afford to continue.
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The contemporary economy of the United States is a far
cry from the one into which earlier waves of immigrants
entered. The resurgence of immigration since 1965 has exact
ly parallelled the period when the labor force of the United
States has sustained unprecedented changes in both size and
composition.
With regard to size, the civilian labor force increased by an
average of 1.8 million workers each year from 1964 to 1973;
and annually by 2.2 million from 1973 to 1980. Since then
the rate of annual increase as officially measured (which
means that it is doubtful if the full effects of growing
numbers of illegal immigrants are included) has declined
slightly. Nonetheless, in 1984 the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) announced that it is revising its long term projections
of labor force growth from the period 1982 to 1990 to 1.6
million net new workers each year. (I would argue that even
this projection is conservative as all past projections by the
BLS have been.)
As for the composition of the labor force, the period since
1965 has been one in which racial and ethnic groups as well
as women have dramatically increased their proportions of
the total labor force. The BLS projects that these patterns
will continue with women accounting for two-thirds of the
annual growth in the labor force and blacks about 25 percent
over the next decade. It is certain especially if immigration
continues the pattern of the past that the Hispanic labor
force will also increase its share disproportionately even
though the BLS did not highlight this group in its projec
tions.
With respect to the entire labor force, the next decade
presents the nation with a unique situation. Because the
"baby boom" generation has now come of age, it is pro
jected that by 1990 the largest single age cohort of the
population will be between the ages of 25 to 44 the prime
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working age years. It is a period when labor force participa
tion is at its highest for both males and females. During the
late 1980s and early 1990s it is predicted that the majority (or
more than half) of the total population of the U.S. will be
participating in the labor force. By 1995, it is expected that
70 percent of the labor force will be between 25 and 54 years
of age. Thus, it is going to be a period in which there will be
mounting pressure on the economy to generate additional
employment opportunities especially for women and
minorities. 22
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the last two
decades of the twentieth century are going to be years in
which the labor force of the nation will be confronted with
immense pressures to accommodate both the growth in the
number of job seekers as well as to changes in the composi
tion of the supply of labor. The quest to meet these
challenges will be difficult enough without being undermined
by an immigration policy that is seemingly oblivious to its
labor market impacts but which, in actuality, has influential
labor market consequences.
The broad outlines of the policy reform needed to make
immigration policy conform to the economic welfare of the
nation are easy to list. With respect to the annual levels of
immigration, there need to be enforceable ceilings. But they
should be ceilings and not established and inflexible
numbers. The actual number of immigrants admitted each
year should be responsive to unemployment trends in the na
tion. Annual immigration levels should fluctuate inversely
with unemployment trends (as is the practice in Canada).
The system should be capable of responding to changing
economic circumstances. The boundary ceiling should be set
by legislation but the precise levels in any given year should
be set administratively. It is implicit, if this were to be done,
that the administrative responsibilities for immigration
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policy should be shifted back to the U.S. Department of
Labor (or some other new agency that might be created to
administer and coordinate all of the nation's human resource
development policies) and away from the U.S. Department
of Justice and the judiciary committees of Congress.
In regard to the actual determination of who is admitted as
a legal immigrant each year, the preference system should
revert back to the primary emphasis on occupational
preferences that characterized the system from 1952 to 1965.
Family reunification should remain an admission criterion
but not the primary factor, as has been the case since 1965.
No other nation in the world allows such a nepotistic and
discriminatory doctrine to dominate its admission system.
The occupational preferences should be increased to at least
the pre-1965 level of 50 percent of the available visas. Full
discretion should be given to the administrative agency to
decide which occupations (skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled)
are in greatest need at any particular time and to admit them.
Included within this discretionary power should be the right
to give preference to immigrants willing to settle in regions
where labor is scarce. The shift away from the dominance of
family reunification would also allow opportunities for
"new seed immigrants" (especially for immigrants from
Africa, who have the most trouble competing under the ex
isting system) to enter.
The refugee and asylee policies of the nation are the most
difficult to integrate into a policy design that focuses on
economic priorities. Obviously, the United States should
continue to participate in the worldwide effort to absorb and
to assist in the accommodation of refugees. But experience
clearly indicates that there must be some limitations on the
number of refugees that are to be admitted and where they
are to be settled. A legislative ceiling should be set on the
number of refugees to be admitted with the understanding
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that, if special circumstances do arise, more refugees may be
admitted but that offsetting reductions will be made in the
number of legal immigrants in the same or the following
year. If a situation should develop that was truly extraor
dinary, Congress could legislate a temporary increase in the
numerical boundaries to accommodate such a unique cir
cumstance. The asylee issue is presently too complex to
discuss in this paper except to note that the current policy is
hopelessly bogged down in a system of judicial paralysis.
Currently, asylees are entitled to almost twice as many levels
of appeals of their status as are provided to convicted
murderers. It is essential that a more expedited system of
reaching closure in these cases be designed. But the ultimate
principle for admission should be the same as refugees:
namely, if asylees permissions are granted, legal immigration
should be reduced accordingly. It is essential that the princi
ple of choice be firmly established in the operation of the na
tion's immigration system. Otherwise, one is confronted
with the chaos of the present system where the policy is
essentially one that ratifies what has already happened
anyway. Moreover, there is no sense establishing the concept
that total immigrant flows should fluctuate with domestic
labor market conditions if the entire process can be cir
cumvented by flows from another source. There are already
some signs that the refugee and asylee system is being used
for purposes (such as economic betterment) other than those
for which it was designed (i.e., to avoid persecution for one's
political and personal views). 23 The full cost of assisting
refugees and asylees to be prepared for entry into the labor
market should be borne by the federal government and not
by local communities.
All of the preceding suggestions, of course, are predicated
on the assumption that a full-scale effort will be mounted to
end the flow of illegal immigrants into the country. It would
make no sense at all to attempt to construct a positive im-
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migration policy that works in tandem with general
economic policy if the entire process can be easily cir
cumvented. The appropriate policies should be designed to
address both the "push" and the "pull" factors that con
tribute to the illegal immigration process. They should in
clude enhanced deterrent policies (e.g., employer sanctions,
enhanced INS funding, and less reliance on the use of the
voluntary departure system) as well as prevention measures
(e.g., extensive economic and technical development
assistance, trade and tariff concessions, and the absolute in
sistence on the adherence to human rights principles and the
protection of human life from murder and torture as a prere
quisite for receipt of the economic aid and trade
concessions).
The absence of any serious effort to forge an immigration
policy based upon labor market considerations means that
immigration policy today functions as a "wild card" among
the nation's array of key labor market policies. Unlike all
other elements of economic policy (e.g., fiscal policy,
monetary policy, employment and training policy, education
policy, and antidiscrimination policy) where attempts are
made by policymakers to orchestrate the diverse policy
elements into a harmony of action to accomplish particular
objectives, immigration policy has been allowed to meander
aimlessly. This is a situation that no sensible nation can
allow to continue.
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The Illegal Men Policy Dilemma
Barry R. Chiswick
University of Illinois at Chicago

Introduction
A lecture and seminar series on the Economics of Interna
tional Migration, and a public lecture on illegal aliens, are
very timely. As a research topic, immigration has long been
the concern of historians and sociologists. It is only in recent
years about a decade ago that economists returned to this
topic.
Economists were concerned with the issue at the turn of
the century and up to the early 1920s until the enactment of
the "national origins" quota system. From then until the
1960s, there was little public policy concern or debate over
general immigration issues, and this is reflected by the virtual
absence of interest in the subject by economists. The 1965
Immigration Amendments abolished the "national origins"
quota system and substituted a "preference system" which
placed greatest emphasis on kinship with a U.S. citizen or
resident alien. But this was done with surprising little public
debate and with a continued virtual vacuum in the economic
literature.
It was only in the 1970s that there was a renewed public
policy interest in immigration issues. Although the policy in
terest focused on illegal immigration, economic research
took a broader approach, exploring all dimensions of im
migrant adjustment and impact, for both legal and illegal
aliens.
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After a decade of high energy prices, sharply fluctuating
rates of economic growth, high and erratic rates of inflation,
and increased concerns for the quality of the environment,
there is now a greater realization that resources are limited
and that continued economic growth is not a gift from the
gods, but rather is dependent on a public policy that fosters
rather than hinders economic growth. All public policy
issues once thought outside the realm of economic thinking
or economic considerations are coming under closer
scrutiny, including immigration policy.
Economists have demonstrated that immigrant flows are,
in part, the consequence of economic forces. They have also
demonstrated that immigrants play an important and com
plex role in the economy in general and in the labor market
in particular. In addition, economists have demonstrated
that immigrants impact on the well-being of the economy
and the American population.
This lecture will be on the contradictions and dilemmas in
herent in forming public policy toward illegal aliens. In so
doing it will point to the direction of sounder policy solu
tions.

The Illegal Alien Debate
The most recent public focus on immigration has been
with respect to illegal aliens. From the last days of the Ford
administration to the present, each session of Congress has
given serious consideration to the enactment of legislation to
grant amnesty to illegal aliens living in the U.S., to impose
for the first time federal sanctions on employers of illegal
aliens, and to strengthen enforcement at the border. In 1984
both houses of Congress passed such legislation, by a large
majority in the Senate and by a handful of votes in the
House. Because of minor differences, the legislation went to
a House/Senate conference committee where it died, in no
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small part because of the newly expressed opposition of both
presidential candidates.
The persistence with which the legislation is brought for
ward, the heated debate, the widely divergent support in the
House and Senate, and the periodic changes in position of
presidents and presidential candidates suggests that illegal
aliens are a difficult policy issue.
Illegal aliens exist because workers are attracted to the
United States by jobs provided by the economy and because
there is an incomplete enforcement of immigration law by
the government. They impact on the labor market by
decreasing the earnings and employment opportunities of
some U.S. workers and increasing them for other U.S.
workers. The size of the illegal alien population is believed to
be large and growing. It has recently been estimated by three
Census Bureau statisticians that 3 to 6 million illegal aliens
were residing in the United States in 1980 (Siegel, Passel and
Robinson, 1981). It is also estimated that half of these illegal
aliens are Mexican nationals. Every indication suggests that
the continued deterioration of the Mexican economy and
political upheavals in Central and South America will be fur
ther spurs to illegal immigration.
Yet, we know surprisingly little about illegal aliens. Why is
there such a large illegal alien population? Why is there so
little research on the topic? Indeed, the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, which issued its report
in 1981, was established primarily to analyze policy regard
ing illegal aliens and the Commission devoted most of its
recommendations to this issue. Yet, it funded no research
relating to the characteristics or impact of illegal aliens. Its
research program played no apparent role in its policy deci
sions.
There is a legislative stalemate in Washington. Too few
resources are budgeted to enforcement for the Immigration
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and Naturalization Service (INS) to have any substantial im
pact. Yet, there is an unwillingness to publicly acknowledge
this "lack of will" and offer amnesty. This public am
bivalence has been quite obvious for at least a decade.
The legislative stalemate may not represent a lack of will,
but rather may be interpreted as a "rational" short-run
response to a policy dilemma. We want foreign workers, but
not their dependents. We allow illegal migration but keep the
probability of arrest and deportation high enough to
discourage the entry of family members. Amnesty, of
course, would allow erstwhile illegal aliens to bring their
dependents spouse, minor children, aged parents to the
United States. This would given them access to our system of
free public education as well as to the generous welfare and
social service benefits that were designed to help Americans
disadvantaged through no fault of their own. (The welfare
benefits include Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
and Medicaid.) Because we want the workers but not the
dependents, and we find it awkward to say so openly, we
perpetuate a cat-and-mouse game between the immigration
authorities and illegal aliens.
If this interpretation is correct, we need not be concerned
with more information on illegal aliens. We prefer continued
obfuscation of the issues to the embarrassment that clarifica
tion might bring. It is apparently better to let the monster
sleep. Unfortunately, the monster will eventually wake up,
and more massive social and economic problems may be at
hand a large, restless and low-skilled illegal alien popula
tion.

Characteristics of Illegal Aliens1
To put these matters in historical perspective, it is impor
tant to indicate that the illegal alien issue is not new. In this
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decade we "celebrate" the 100th anniversary of illegal aliens
in the United States. The first illegal aliens were Chinese
because the first barriers to legal immigration were imposed
against unskilled Chinese workers in the 1880s. There was a
racist fear of the "Yellow Peril," of hoards of unskilled
Chinese workers flooding California and depressing wages
for similarly unskilled whites. It is unlikely that the feared
massive migration would have taken place even if there were
no barriers. Perhaps more intriguing, data from recent cen
suses indicate that the descendants of the Chinese workers
have achieved higher levels of schooling, occupational status
and earnings than the descendants of the whites who a cen
tury ago believed the Chinese could never be anything but
unskilled laborers.
In the twentieth century, however, the main focus has
been on Mexican illegal aliens. A cyclical pattern has emerg
ed. During periods of political turmoil (e.g., 1910 Revolu
tion) or economic slack in Mexico, large migration streams
flow northward, and the size of these streams seems to have
accelerated in recent decades. On the other hand, during
periods of economic slack in the U.S., the northward flow is
slowed or stopped, and sometimes reversed. In the recession
following the World War I boom, during the early 1930s,
and during the early 1950s, the net flow may have been
toward Mexico, that is, the number of Mexican nationals
who left the U.S. may have exceeded the number who
entered this country. These reverse flows have sometimes
been generated by wholesale arrests and deportations of per
sons who "look Mexican."
Mexican nationals form the bulk of the illegal alien
population in the 1980s the data on apprehensions in
dicates that 90 percent are Mexican nationals. But this
statistic overstates the proportion of Mexicans in the illegal
alien population. Immigration and Naturalization Service
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concentrates its resources along the Mexican border, perhaps
(as some allege) because it is relatively inexpensive to catch
people sneaking across the border and deport them. In addi
tion, many Mexican illegal aliens work in the United States
only part of the year and return to Mexico during the slack
season. Since apprehensions are most likely to take place at
or shortly after entry, this to and fro migration also raises
the proportion of Mexican nationals in the arrest data
relative to the stock of illegal aliens residing in the U.S.
It is believed that about half of the illegal alien population
living in the United States are Mexican nationals, and that
the other half come from a wide range of countries and all
parts of the globe. West Indians, Central and South
Americans, East Asians, South Asians, Africans, Near
Easterners, Europeans and Canadians are all represented
among illegal aliens. Of the Mexican illegal aliens, about 70
percent originate in six states of Mexico's Central Plateau.
This is a poor area which served as a battlefield during the
revolutions and rebellions earlier in this century, and which
has been passed over by whatever benefits emerged from the
Green Revolution of the 1950s and the short-lived oil bonan
za in the 1970s (Cross and Sandos, 1981).
There are reasons why Mexico provides the largest number
of illegal aliens. We share a border about 2,000 miles long
which runs through wilderness areas. Where rivers form part
of the border they are often shallow and easy to cross.
Hence, "entry without inspection" is relatively easy for
Mexican nationals. Illegal aliens from most other countries
either use fraudulent documents to enter the U.S. or have to
violate a legal visa, such as working in violation of a student
or visitor visa, or overstaying their visa. Increasingly, na
tionals of other countries are using Mexico and Canada for
the purpose of surreptitiously entering the United States.
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Ease of entry may be a necessary condition for illegal im
migration, but it is not a sufficient explanation. After all, the
border with Canada is as easy to cross as the border with
Mexico, yet there are relatively few Canadian illegal aliens:
less than 1 percent of apprehended illegal aliens are Cana
dian nationals. Nor are legal immigrants more numerous
from Canada than from Mexico. In recent years there have
been fewer than 15,000 Canadian immigrants annually,
while legal immigrants from Mexico have exceeded 55,000
annually.
The U.S.-Mexican border is unique. No other border
separates two countries that differ so sharply in average in
come. The temptation to go north to "strike it rich" working
as a busboy, a dishwasher, or fruit picker is just too strong to
resist. Mexico's economy has not done well in the 20th cen
tury in spite of its abundance of natural resources. High fer
tility rates combined with falling death rates, particularly in
fant mortality rates, have generated large cohorts of youths.
Government development policy has focused on capitalintensive rather than labor-intensive sectors of the economy.
Mismanagement of the economy has retarded the rate of
economic growth. The poverty and absence of job oppor
tunities, particularly in the rural areas, have generated a
massive migration to Mexico City, the border towns, and the
United States.
Many Mexican farm workers gained experience working in
the United States in the bracero program.This was a contract
farm labor program started in 1942 to augment wartime
labor supplies and was terminated in 1964. As a result of the
experience gained in the bracero program, hundreds of
thousands of Mexican farm workers had their appetites
whetted for the good life up north. They, their younger
brothers, their sons became illegal aliens when the bracero
program ended and other opportunities for legal migration
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were reduced. Indeed, in the face of a growing supply of im
migrants from Mexico the imposition of the numerical ceil
ings on Western Hemisphere immigration in 1968, and the
country ceilings in 1977, reduced avenues for legal migra
tion, thereby generating pressures for increased illegal im
migration.
There is little solid data on the demographic or labor
market characteristics of illegal aliens (Chiswick 1984). The
data on apprehensions suggest they are predominately lowskilled, young adult (age 18 to 30), males from Mexico.
While it is undoubtedly true that the apprehensions data can
be expected to exaggerate these very characteristics, it seems
reasonable that qualitatively these characterizations are ac
curate. Illegal aliens tend to be unskilled, in part because
workers in higher skilled jobs may have more difficulty in
masking their illegal status, and in part because an occupa
tional license, certification or union membership may be re
quired. In addition, because of the existence of skills that are
specific to the country in which they are acquired, apprehen
sions and deportations may be more costly for skilled illegal
aliens than for workers with few if any skills. Thus, among
unsuccessful visa applicants (or potential applicants) those
with few or no skills have the greater incentive to attempt an
illegal entry.
The skewed demographic composition of illegal aliens and
the high rate of to and fro migration, particularly with
respect to Mexico, are consequences of illegal alien workers
leaving their wives, young children and aged parents in the
home country. This does not arise from their preferences,
but from the circumstances of their illegal status. Dependent
family members are costly to move to the United States, par
ticularly if illegal means are to be used. Once in the U.S., the
dependents may not confer the eligibility for welfare and
social service benefits that legal residents may receive. In-

The Policy Dilemma 81

deed, the dependents may increase the probability of the en
tire family being apprehended and deported, thereby increas
ing the costs and risks of deportation.

Alternative Policies: Amnesty Versus
Strict Enforcement
If illegal alien workers were granted amnesty and could
bring their dependents to the U.S., the demographic
characteristics of this population would change. The extent
of to and fro migration would decline, the ratio of
dependents to workers would increase, and, because of the
low skill level, the family members would be eligibile for a
variety of welfare (income transfer) and social service pro
grams. In addition, the incentive for even more families to
move north would increase under the realistic view that if
amnesty is granted once it will be granted again. Hence, the
case against amnesty.
But what about a more vigorous enforcement of immigra
tion law? The trends have, if anything, been in the opposite
direction (Chiswick 1981/82). The number of permanent
positions in the Immigration and Naturalization Service in
creased from 7,000 in 1960 to nearly 11,000 in 1979, a 60 per
cent increase. During the same period, however, the annual
number of legal immigrants doubled from one-quarter of a
million per year to one-half of a million. Nonimmigrant ad
missions of aliens as tourists, students, etc. increased 8-fold,
from 1.1 million to 9.3 million per year. And, the number of
apprehensions of illegal aliens increased 14-fold, from
70,000 to about one million. Clearly a tremendous strain has
been placed on INS resources.
To try to close the floodgates,
resources on border enforcement
enforcement. However, there is
border in which large numbers

INS has concentrated its
at the expense of interior
a revolving door at the
of illegal aliens are ap-
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prehended one night, to be deported the next day, to try
again on a subsequent night. Except for deportation, there
are no penalties imposed on illegal aliens, even those who are
flagrant repeat offenders. The cat-and-mouse game along
the border increases apprehensions per million dollars of
budget expenditure, but may have little deterrent effect.

Benefits of Current Policy
What are the benefits of current policy? The benefits come
in the form of the increase in income to the native population
of the U.S. from a larger pool of low-skilled immigrant
workers. An increase in the supply of low-skilled foreign
workers depresses the wages and working conditions of lowskilled native workers, and this receives much public atten
tion. What receives less public notice is that the increase in
the number of low-skilled workers increases the productivity
of "complementary factors of production," that is, higher
skilled workers and capital. Any factor of production is
more productive the more of other factors with which it can
work. A bulldozer on a road construction project is more
productive if there are more workers to keep it running 24
hours a day, repair it when it breaks down, and redirect traf
fic away from the construction site. A scientist is more pro
ductive if there are assistants to clean the test tubes, run sim
ple experiments, do bibliographic research, type
manuscripts, etc.
The gains in income to skilled workers and capital from
the migration of low-skilled workers are likely to exceed the
losses to native low-skilled workers. 2 This means that as a
result of low-skilled illegal migration, the income of the
native U.S. population is increased!

The Policy Dilemma
I have outlined the policy dilemma. As a result of restric
tions on immigration, there are a large number of people in
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the U.S. illegally, perhaps 3 to 6 million people. They are
disproportionately unskilled young adult males from Mex
ico. Largely because of their illegal status, they do not bring
their dependent family members. These workers are produc
tive and they increase the income of the native U.S. popula
tion.
On the other hand, if they brought their dependent family
members with them they would be eligible for a variety of
welfare, social service and educational programs. Since the
workers are low-skilled, their use of these benefits could ex
ceed the increased income of the native population. That is,
the increase in taxes needed to pay for these programs for the
dependents of the "illegal aliens" might easily exceed the
gains in income to the native population.
With their status legalized, illegal aliens could bring their
dependents to the U.S. and claim benefits from the variety of
public programs that subsidize the poor, the young and the
aged. Further, amnesty would encourage further illegal im
migration because of the realistic expectation that if offered
once it will be offered repeatedly. Hence, amnesty is perceiv
ed as an unacceptable solution.
Strict enforcement of immigration law is also perceived as
unacceptable. The costs of strict enforcement may be very
high in terms of civil liberties and of resources devoted to en
forcement activities. A greatly enhanced and better equipped
staff of INS agents would be required to increase the effec
tiveness of interior enforcement as well as border enforce
ment, but this would be more costly. Sanctions against
employers who knowingly hire illegal aliens are frequently
proposed, although for employer sanctions to be effective a
national identity system (or registration) of one sort or
another would be required. It seems inappropriate to compel
employers to enforce a law that the federal authorities show
little will to enforce.
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Employer sanctions are the equivalent of an employment
tax. This tax raises the relative cost of labor, particularly for
low-skilled, high-turnover jobs. The imposition of such a tax
may further worsen the job opportunities of low-skilled
workers legally in the U.S., particularly youths and
minorities.
But perhaps the greatest cost of strict enforcement would
be the loss of the income the native population gains from
the work of illegal aliens.

Conclusions—An Alternative Policy*
From the short-run perspective, the current legislative
stalemate may be "optimal," given that we do not want a
legal system that sanctions a two-class society one eligible
for welfare and social service benefits and the other not. We
can view amnesty and a stringent enforcement of immigra
tion law as polar approaches to solving the problem, but for
different reasons they are viewed as too costly. The conse
quence of current policy, however, is the presence of a large
and apparently growing segment of the population that lives
at the margin of or outside the law. As this population
grows, and as increasing numbers of children of illegal aliens
are born in the U.S., and hence are U.S. citizens, the
political and social pressures will also grow. A policy that
looks optimal in the short run may thus not be so attractive
in the long run.
This discussion suggests that, as a society, we need to more
clearly delineate our priorities and policy options regarding
illegal aliens. A partial solution to the dilemma is to restore a
modest guest worker program. To discourage "temporary
workers" from evolving into "permanent workers" outside
the regular immigration system, entry would be permitted
only for the guest workers and not for dependents, the con
tracts would be for a short maximum number of months (say
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six months), and only for jobs with clearly defined seasonal
patterns. Returning to the home country would be required
before a worker could receive a new contract, and a limit
might be placed on the total number of contracts that a
worker could receive.
Under current policy there is some probability that an il
legal alien will be apprehended. But the penalty if one is
apprehended is very low, particularly for Mexican nationals
apprehended at the border. Deportation involves little op
portunity cost to a Mexican national apprehended at or near
the border since he is likely to return almost immediately.
Apprehending individuals who violate the law creates no
deterrent effect if there is no penalty when they are ap
prehended. Hence, current policy regarding apprehended il
legal aliens has little or no deterrent effect, particularly
regarding Mexican nationals.
To induce compliance, two types of penalties could be im
posed on those who enter the country illegally, who violate
the condition of a legal entry, or who violate the terms of
their temporary worker contract. One penalty would be a
probation period during which a legal entry is barred,
whether as a temporary worker or otherwise. The other
would be detention of the illegal worker for a period of
several months prior to deportation.
Detention may be the only mechanism for reducing the ex
tent to which the border is treated as a revolving door.
Pecuniary penalties are inappropriate for the low-income il
legal alien population because the fines could not be col
lected. However, detention for several months would be
costly to the alien and have a deterrent effect. Since much of
the illegal immigration is for seasonal employment, a two or
three month detention for a first apprehension could have a
major impact on the incentive to seek work in the U.S. As a
further deterrent, the length of the detention period could be
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increased with the number of times the individual has been
apprehended.
The major criticism of detention is usually expressed in
terms of the high cost of incarcerating "one million ap
prehended illegal aliens.'* But this exaggerates the problem.
Because the revolving door at the border results in multiple
apprehensions of the same person, the number of different
individuals apprehended is much smaller than the number of
apprehensions. With the imposition of penalties, the number
of attempted illegal entries would fall. As a result, the same
border enforcement resources would mean fewer apprehen
sions but would raise the probability that an attempted il
legal entry would result in an apprehension further
discouraging illegal migration. Indeed, with the imposition
of meaningful penalties, greater deterrence could be achiev
ed even with fewer border enforcement resources. Finally,
low cost minimum security detention facilities could be con
structed in rural areas near the Mexican border.
These policy recommendations will not end all illegal im
migration. However, by providing both the opportunity and
incentives for operating within the legal framework, they of
fer a better hope than current policy, or the most frequently
advocated alternatives (employer sanctions and amnesty),
for retaining many of the benefits while reducing many of
the costs of the current illegal immigration. The recommen
dations offer a better prospect for regaining control over the
U.S. borders.

NOTES
1. The Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser
vice is an invaluable source of data on legal an illegal immigrants. (U.S.
Department of Justice.)
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2. This follows from the increase in the aggregate income of the popula
tion exceeding the earnings received by immigrants. For a clarification
see Chiswick (1982), pp. 298-313.
3. For a fuller discussion of the policy alternatives see Cafferty,
Chiswick, Greeley and Sullivan (1983).
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Immigration and the
U.S. Taxpayer
Francine D. Blau
University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign

In recent years considerable national concern has focused
on the issue of immigration. Two factors have contributed to
this interest: first, an increase in the influx of immigrants in
to this country both legal and illegal; and second, a change
in the traditional sources of immigrants away from the Euro
pean countries and towards Asia, Latin American and the
Caribbean. Many perceive the current group of immigrants
as less skilled, perhaps, and less highly educated than those
who came a number of years ago; it is also feared that cur
rent immigrants will be more difficult to assimilate. This has
gelled into a concern over the impact of immigrants on the
U.S. economy and on the economic well-being of native
Americans.
As we shall see, public perceptions regarding shifts in the
magnitude and sources of immigration are indeed correct.
However, to say that such changes have occurred is not
necessarily to say that they constitute a problem.
Nonetheless, there are serious immigration policy issues con
fronting the government. How many immigrants should we
admit? Another problem, greater today than in the past, is
whether we can determine the number of immigrants to ad
mit. That is, can we control our own borders? What should
we do about the current population of illegal immigrants liv
ing in this country? Although economists cannot answer all
89
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these specific questions, they can assist policymakers by do
ing research that sheds light on the economic impact of im
migration on the United States.
There are two primary aspects to consider in addressing
this issue. First, what type of individuals are the immigrants
and how do they compare to the native-born population.
The foreign-born still do not comprise an especially large
proportion of the U.S. population. Because the flow of im
migrants is greater than it was a few years ago, however, the
composition of the population is changing. And we have the
right to ask: Is this a change for the better or for the worse?
Or is it perhaps not a significant change at all?
Another question that needs to be considered is far more
difficult. What are the consequences for native-born
Americans of this influx of immigrants? In particular, do
immigrants compete for jobs with some particular sectors of
the U.S. population? For these groups, what is the impact on
their wages, unemployment rates, etc.?
It is necessary to answer these questions to get a com
prehensive view of the economic impact of immigrants. In
this paper, however, we concentrate on the first question.
What kind of individuals are the immigrants, and how do
they compare to native-born Americans? Within these con
cerns we focus on the consequences for the American tax
payer of this inflow of immigrants. We especially emphasize
issues related to the utilization of transfer payments by im
migrants relative to use by the native-born. Transfer
payments are money paid by the government to individuals
and their families under various circumstances, for example,
welfare payments to individuals or families whose income is
very low, unemployment compensation for people who have
lost their jobs, or social security for people who have retired.
Do immigrants receive more of such transfer payments and
if so, why?
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Less emphasis will be given to the other side of the
coin how much do immigrants contribute to the tax
receipts of the government? But we shall also consider
evidence that has a bearing on this issue. That is, how
economically successful have immigrants been? This is rele
vant because it is one of the fundamental facts of life that if
you are economically successful in this country, Uncle Sam is
going to share in that success to some extent.
Before turning to a detailed discussion of these issues, we
first review trends in immigration in order both to establish
in greater detail what recent trends have been, and to place
them in historical perspective. As we shall see, the current
situation, as well as the fears associated with it, are not
historically unprecedented. In previous instances, those fears
proved groundless, as they may in the current situation.

Trends in Immigration
The trends that have given rise to recent concerns are il
lustrated in Table 1. The 1970s was indeed a period of in
creased immigration flows compared to the two preceding
decades, both in terms of the absolute number of immigrants
and their size relative to the population. Further, the pace of
change appears to be accelerating, with both the number of
immigrants and their size relative to the population higher in
the late 1970s and early 1980s than at the beginning of the
decade. As a consequence of these developments, the
foreign-born increased from 4.7 percent of the U.S. popula
tion in 1970 to 6.2 percent in 1980. 1 While the size of the
foreign-born group remains small relative to the population,
it represents a 32 percent increase in their proportion over a
10-year period. In addition, the concentration of particular
nationalities in certain parts of the country for example,
Cubans in Florida, Mexicans in the Southwest, and some of
the Asian groups in the West means that the proportion of
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foreign-born is considerably higher than the national average
in a number of localities.

Table 1
Immigration: 1820 to 1981

Period
1820- 1981
18201831 1841 1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 -

1830b
1840C
1850d
I8606
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980f

Total
Number
Rate8
(1000s)
50,252

3.4

152
599
1,713
2,598
2,315
2,812
5,247
3,688
8,795
5,736
4,107
528
1,035
2,515
3,322
4,493

1.2
3.9
8.4
9.3
6.4
6.2
9.2
5.3
10.4
5.7
3.5
.4
.7
1.5
1.7
2.1

Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981

Total
Number
Rate3
(1000s)
297
323
362
454
359
373
370
385
400
395
386
399
462
601
460
531
597

1.5
1.6
1.8
2.3
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.8
1.9
1.9
1.8
1.9
2.1
2.8
2.1
2.3
2.6

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of
the United States, 1985.
a. Annual rate per 1,000 U.S. population, 10-year rate computed by dividing sum of an
nual immigration totals by sum of annual U.S. population totals for same 10 years,
b. October 1, 1819 - September 30, 1830.
c. October 1, 1830 - December 31, 1840.
d. Calendai years,
e. January 1, 1861 - June 30, 1870.
f. Includes transition quarter, July 1 to September 30, 1976.
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The public perception that there has been a shift in the
place of origin of immigrants is also borne out by the data.
Asians constituted only 6 percent of immigrants during the
1950s, in comparison to 13 percent in the 1960s and 36 per
cent in the 1980s. Immigrants from Latin America and the
Caribbean increased their proportion of the total from 23
percent in the 1950s to about 40 percent in the 1960s and
1970s. Overall, these two sources of immigrants grew from
29 percent of the immigrant group in the 1950s to 77 percent
in the 1970s.
Table 1 shows that the U.S. has experienced two previous
periods of substantial increase in immigration flows. Indeed,
in both of the earlier cases the numbers involved were con
siderably larger, both absolutely and relative to the popula
tion. The first case was in the 1840s and 1850s. This was
associated with an influx of Irish who increased their propor
tion of immigrants from 12 percent in 1830 to about 45 per
cent in 1840 and 1850. The second case was the great wave of
immigrants who came in the late 1800s and early 1900s.
Their numbers were totally unprecedented in American
history, with 23.5 million arriving between 1880 and 1920. In
1910, 18 percent of the population was foreign-born. There
was also a change in the source of immigration at that
time away from England, Scotland, Scandanavia, Ger
many and Ireland and towards Southern, Eastern and Cen
tral Europe, including such nationalities as Serbo-Croatians,
Bohemians and Moravians, Austro-Hungarians, Russians,
Greeks, Spaniards, and Turks.
In both these cases, there was a general impression that the
new crop of immigrants was less skilled and less educated
than the previous group, and considerable fear that the large
mass of immigrants could never be digested and assimilated
into the American mainstream. There was the belief that the
immigrants were having a negative effect on the well-being
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of the American wage earner. Indeed these views were
responsible for the passage of restrictive federal legislation in
1921 curtailing the entry of immigrants. Nonetheless, there is
probably general agreement today that the U.S. did readily
assimilate these groups. And further, that these immigrants
also enriched America with the many good things they
brought to this country. Thus, based on the historical ex
perience, we can perhaps confront our current problems with
some degree of optimism about immigration.

Immigrants and the Transfer System1
In this section, we seek to ascertain whether or not im
migrants utilize the transfer system to a greater degree than
the native-born and what factors may be responsible for any
immigrant-native differences. In seeking answers to these
questions, it is important, not only to identify any average
differences that may exist, but also to understand the
underlying causes of any differences that are observed. This
is necesssary because one of our goals will be to apply the in
sights of what we learn about immigrants today to im
migrants who may come in the future. Since future arrivals
may differ from the present group in terms of their educa
tion, race or ethnicity, etc., overall averages are not infor
mative.
The data we use are from the 1976 Survey of Income and
Education which gives income and transfer information for
1975. This may be disappointing to some people. The con
cern is about a current problem; can data that are 10-yearsold be relevant to it? The problem that we confront in
economics is that often the type of data needed to do the
kind of careful and systematic analysis presented here are
not collected very frequently. Further, it takes a considerable
amount of time to perform these types of analyses.
Nonetheless, such data can shed some light on the issues of
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concern to us, particularly when used to uncover the
underlying causes of any immigrant-native differences. It is
also encouraging that a recent study by Tienda and Jensen
(1985), which used data from the 1980 Census, finds similar
results for one of the types of transfer use we consider,
immigrant-native differences in welfare dependency.
In looking at transfers, let us first distinguish between two
types of transfer payments. The first are payments received
from welfare programs. These include public assistance,
which is generally paid by state and local governments, and
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a federal
program that is targeted on female family heads. Although
families with unemployed fathers are technically also eligible
in many states, the vast majority of recipients of AFDC are
female family heads. Also included is Supplemental Security
Income (SSI), a federal program which is targeted on the ag
ed. Welfare programs share the common characteristic that
they are paid for out of general tax revenues. In addition,
eligibility for such programs, as well as the amount of money
received, is determined by need, not by any kind of prior
contribution or by prior employment of a certain kind.
The second type of transfer payments are payments from
social insurance programs. These include social security, the
railroad retirement program, unemployment insurance,
workers' compensation, and various veterans' programs.
These programs are paid for out of contributions by
employers and/or workers and not out of general tax
revenue. Eligibility for these programs entails employment in
a so-called covered sector for a specified period of time. So,
for example, not just anyone who becomes unemployed is
necessarily eligible for unemployment insurance, and not
just anyone who retires is necessarily eligible for social
security, although the coverage of these programs has
become fairly widespread. Payment levels, the receipts that

96 Immigration & the Taxpayer

people get from these programs, are guided primarily,
although not solely, by the replacement ratio principle. The
replacement ratio principle is designed to replace a specified
proportion of income that has been lost through unemploy
ment, disability, retirement, etc. In fact, in these programs,
while need is sometimes taken into account, the basic idea is
that if you were doing better before you entered the transfer
program, you should receive a higher transfer payment.
The reason these two types of programs are distinguished
is because the differences between them may be important to
policymakers. That is, policymakers may distinguish be
tween monies that are going to welfare recipients and those
that are being collected by individuals through social in
surance programs. This is because it is widely believed that
the people getting social insurance payments have in effect
earned that transfer payment through the prior contributions
they or their employers have made. However, it should be
noted that most contributory programs in the U.S. are in
fact pay-as-you-go programs. For example, it is not the case
under social security that the taxes you pay now are saved up
for you and that when you retire at 65 you get the very
money that you paid in, or the returns from investing that
money. In fact, the social security taxes you pay today, go to
support older people who are currently retired. Nonetheless,
it is significant in the public mind that the recipients of
payments from social insurance programs have made a con
tribution towards financing the programs in the past (or their
employers have done so).
Now that we have explained the differences between these
two types of programs, let us look at the receipt of transfer
payments by families headed by immigrants and the nativeborn in 1975 as shown in Table 2. Male-headed families (in
cluding married couples) and female-headed families are
distinguished. 3 A superficial examination of this table does

Immigration & the Taxpayer 97

lend some support to the idea that immigrants may well be a
drain on the transfer system. Among both male- and femaleheaded families, immigrants receive higher transfer
payments than the native-born. On average, the transfers
received by families headed by a male immigrant were 52
percent ($546) higher than the receipts of families headed by
native-born males. As the table shows, this was due to im
migrant families' greater likelihood of participating in each
type of program (welfare and social insurance), as well as,
the higher average level of payments received by immigrant
families who were program participants. Interestingly
enough, among female heads, immigrants receive lower
welfare payments on average, but higher social insurance
payments. Overall, their receipts from transfer programs are
13 percent ($196) higher than their native-born counterparts,
primarily due to their higher probability of participating in
social insurance programs.
The questions we have to consider are why do these dif
ferences exist and what are the policy implications of them?
The first question may in turn be divided into two parts.
First, we may determine whether immigrant families place
greater reliance on transfer programs than native families
with similar characteristics. So, if we found an immigrant
family and matched it up with a native family in terms of the
head's education, the number of family members, etc.,
would the immigrant family receive higher transfer payments
than the otherwise similar native family? In other words, are
immigrant families more transfer-prone? Second, we may in
vestigate the role that differences in characteristics between
the immigrant and native-born groups play in producing dif
ferences in transfer receipts. That is, to what extent are the
higher transfers received by immigrant families due to dif
ferences in their levels of education, family composition, etc.

98 Immigration & the Taxpayer
Table 2
Receipt of Transfers
1975
Female heads

Male heads
Type of program
Average payments
(all families)
Welfare
Social insurance
Total
Percent participating
Welfare
Social insurance
Average payments
(program participants
only)
Welfare
Social insurance

Natives

$

73
979
1052

4.6
36.5

$1585
2680

Immigrants

$ 93
1505
1598

5.5
45.6

$1684
3301

Natives

$ 416
1095
1511

21.1
44.9

$1974
2437

Immigrants

$ 295
1411
1707

14.7
57.5

$2002
2454

SOURCE: Francine D. Blau, "The Use of Transfer Payments by Immigrants," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 37 (January 1984), Table 1, p. 223. Reprinted by permission.
NOTE: Based on data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE). Observations
are weighted by sampling weights reported in the SIE. Family heads must be 18 years of age
or older to be included.

In summary, we seek to determine to what extent the
higher transfer receipts of immigrant families are due to
(1) similar immigrant and native families acting differently
and (2) the fact that immigrant and native families are not
similar but rather differ in a variety of ways that are poten
tially relevant to transfer use. We then consider the policy
implications of these findings.
As illustrated in Table 3, immigrants have a variety of
characteristics that could potentially increase their use of
transfer payments. A higher proportion of immigrants than
of native-born family heads are minorities. Immigrants are
somewhat less likely to be black, but a higher proportion of
them are comprised of other nonwhites or Hispanics. Since
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minorities tend to encounter greater difficulty in the labor
market, a higher proportion of minorities among immigrants
could contribute to a greater reliance on the transfer system.
Table 3
Means of Selected Characteristics
1975
Characteristic
Race-ethnicity (%)
Black
Other nonwhite
Hispanic
Age of head
Mean age
% 65 or older
% 18 to 30
Family members
% 65 or older
Number of children
under 18
Education of head
English ability of head
% with poor English
metropolitan area
South
West
Central
Northeast

Male heads
Immigrants
Natives

Female heads
Immigrants
Natives

9
1
2

4
10
23

19
1
2

6
6
18

44
14
27

51
30
17

49
29
29

58
47
13

9

21

3

3

0.9
12.1
0.2
66
33
18
28
21

0.8
10.7
15
86
17
28
17
38

0.6
11.6
0.4
69
33
18
27
22

0.4
9.7
15
88
15
27
16
42

SOURCE: Francine D. Blau, "The Use of Transfer Payments by Immigrants," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 37 (January 1984), Table 2, p. 225. Reprinted by permission.
NOTE: Based on data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Education (SIE). Observations
are weighted by sampling weights reported in the SIE. Family heads must be 18 years of age
or older to be included.
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In 1975, immigrant heads of families had lower educa
tional attainment on average than natives. Among men, they
averaged over a year less of education; among the female
heads of families, it was almost two years less education. Im
migrants are also more likely not to be able to speak English
or understand English well. Fifteen percent of the male and
female immigrant heads could not speak or understand
English well compared to less than 1 percent of native-born
Americans. The location of immigrants might contribute to
their higher use of transfer payments as well. Immigrants
were more likely than natives to be located in metropolitan
areas where transfer payments tend to be more generous or
to be located in the Northeast where there is both a reputa
tion and a practice of higher transfer payments, and they
were much less likely to live in the South where transfer
payments are lower.
The really key factor in explaining immigrant-native dif
ferences, however, turns out to be none of the above, but
simply the fact that immigrants on average are older than
native-born Americans. For example, the average age of
male native family heads was 44 compared to 51 years of age
for the immigrants. Among the female family heads, the
average age of the native-born was 49 compared to 58 for the
immigrants. It is even more graphic if you look at the pro
portion of family heads that are 65 years of age or over 14
percent for the male natives compared to 30 percent for the
immigrants. For female family heads, the figures are 29 per
cent for natives and 47 percent for immigrants. In addition,
in male-headed families a higher proportion of the other
family members in the immigrant than in the native families
are also 65 or over. Older people are obviously more likely to
be retired and thus collecting social security benefits, Sup
plemental Security Income, etc. So it is not surprising that an
older population would be more transfer-prone. But these
age differences raise two additional questions: (1) Why are
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the immigrants an older population? (2) If the immigrantnative difference in transfer payments is primarily due to the
fact that immigrants are an older population, is the differen
tial of concern from a policy point of view?
First of all, why are immigrants an older population? That
simply has to do with the history of immigration discussed
above. The age distribution of the native population is deter
mined primarily by domestic birth and death rates. But the
age distribution of immigrants is determined by the historical
pattern of flows of immigrants into this country. As we have
seen, these flows peaked in the late 19th and early 20th cen
turies. Thus, a considerably higher portion of immigrants
than of natives are elderly simply because a relatively high
proportion of immigrants came in the late 1800s and early
1900s. Another contributing factor is the impact of the postWorld War II baby boom. A disproportionate share of the
native population is relatively young because they were born
during the baby boom years. But as Table 1 suggests, by
1976, no comparable upsurge in immigration for that age
group had occurred. This inference is borne out in Table 3
where we see that a considerably smaller proportion of im
migrant than of native heads was aged 18 to 30 in 1976 (i.e.,
born during the baby boom). Thus the answer to the first
question of why the immigrants are an older population is
simply historical accident.
What are the consequences from a policy point of view of
transfer differentials that are due to such an age disparity?
To the extent that it is due to this factor, a fairly strong case
can be made that the higher utilization of transfer payments
by immigrants does not represent a cause for concern. First,
as with any investment in human capital, immigration is
more profitable the earlier in the life cycle that it takes place.
This is because there are more years over which to reap the
returns to the investment. Since this is the case, most im-
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migrants come to this country at a relatively young age4 and
the vast majority of the older immigrants have spent most of
their working years, including their most productive years, in
the United States. This means that they have already made
substantial contributions to tax receipts and to contributory
social insurance programs and it is not a matter of concern
that as they become older they receive these transfer
payments.
Second, to the extent that transfer payments to older in
dividuals represent an intergenerational transfer from the
current young population to the current older population,
immigrants have their own working-age children who are
making positive contributions to this system and thus in an
overall sense are helping to support them.
Finally, the age distribution of immigrants can be
manipulated by public policy in a beneficial manner. For ex
ample, it could be used to even out population imbalances in
age composition due to fluctuations in domestic birth rates.
For example, since the baby boom was followed by the baby
bust of the late 1960s through the 1980s, it might make sense
to import immigrants to bolster the size of the young
working-age population as these smaller cohorts enter the
labor market. Of course, young people may prefer to have
fewer individuals entering the job market with them and thus
less competition. This consideration would have to be weigh
ed too. In any case, the age distribution of immigrants is sub
ject to public policy and from that perspective is not a cause
for concern.
Is age in fact the primary reason for the observed dif
ferences in transfer utilization? To answer that question, we
first consider whether otherwise similar immigrant and
native families do indeed behave similarly in terms of their
transfer use. If the answer to that question is yes, then the
reason for differences in transfer use between the two groups
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must be differences in their characteristics. The
characteristics that are controlled for in testing for
immigrant-native differences in behavior are (1) factors that
contribute to potential labor market success, including
(potential) experience, education, race and ethnic group;
(2) the presence of other income and assets that would have
an impact on whether or not people need to turn to transfer
payments and whether they qualify for them;
(3) demographic factors, such as the size and composition of
families; (4) location, because, as mentioned earlier, some
localities are more generous than others.
After controlling for the effects of these factors, it was
found that behavioral differences between immigrants and
similar native-born Americans were negligible. And, where
differences did exist, they tended to favor the immigrants.
Immigrants were less likely to be on welfare and collected
lower welfare payments than otherwise similar natives. All
else equal, receipts from welfare programs were estimated to
be 59 percent lower among male-headed immigrant families
and 57 percent lower among female-headed immigrant
families. Holding other factors constant, immigrant families
did collect slightly (2 percent) higher social insurance
payments. On average, totaling the two together, for male
family heads, the overall receipt of transfers were about the
same for immigrant and native families, and, for female
family heads, the transfer payments to immigrant families
were actually 8 percent lower than to their native counter
parts.
The time pattern of transfer receipts was also examined in
terms of the length of time the family head had resided in the
U.S. It was found that, all else equal, immigrants had lower
welfare receipts at every duration of residence. That is, both
recent immigrants and those who had been here for a long
period of time collected lower welfare payments. Why is this
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the case? One possible explanation is that, as Chiswick
(1978) points out, immigration tends to be selective of more
highly motivated and able individuals. A simple rationale for
this is that it takes more get-up-and-go if you are unhappy
with your situation or simply believe you could do better
elsewhere to move to a completely different society. The
lower use of welfare by immigrants, all else equal, is addi
tional evidence that they constitute a very highly motivated
population. Thus, while the stereotype has developed that
some people come to the United States in order to collect
welfare or that immigrants are quick to fall back on public
assistance, there is absolutely no support whatsoever in the
data for those notions.
In contrast to the case of welfare, collection of social in
surance transfers by immigrants in comparison to similar
natives was found to vary with length of time in the country.
When immigrants first arrive, they are less likely to collect
social insurance payments than are native-born individuals.
This is attributable to the fact that it takes a while to become
covered to find the types of jobs that will make you eligible
for these programs and to hold the jobs for a sufficient
period of time. As their length of residence increases, im
migrants are more likely to qualify for social insurance pro
grams, and thus, receipts from these programs increase to
the native level and eventually go a little bit beyond that.
Since differences in immigrant-native responses to the
same characteristics do not appear to account for the observ
ed differences in transfer receipts between the two groups
reported in Table 2, the transfer differential must be the
result of differences in the characteristics of immigrant and
native families. As expected, age-related factors were found
to play the major role. Age-related factors include not only
the age of the household head, him or herself, but other
things that are related to their age, such as the ages of other
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adult family members, the presence and ages of children, etc.
Among males, age-related factors were more than sufficient
to account for the immigrant-native differential in welfare
receipts; they explained 98 percent of the differential in
social insurance receipts and 99 percent of the differential in
total transfer receipts. Among female-headed families, agerelated factors accounted for 55 percent of the lower levels of
welare received by immigrants. (The opposing effect of agerelated factors on the welfare receipts of male- and femaleheads probably reflects the greater relative importance of
Supplemental Security Income among the former and Aid to
Families with Dependent Children among the latter.) Agerelated factors were sufficient to explain all of the higher use
of social insurance and total transfers by female-headed im
migrant families.
Interestingly enough, the higher proportion of minorities
and those with poor English among immigrants did not, on
net, increase their use of transfers. While families headed by
a member of a minority group tended to receive higher
welfare payments, all else equal, their receipts from social in
surance programs were lower. The latter may be due to dif
ficulty obtaining employment in the covered sector. On
balance, their total transfer receipts were lower. Families
whose head did not speak or understand English well were
more likely to be on welfare than otherwise similar families,
but were less likely to receive payments from social insurance
programs (perhaps because of difficulty getting a job in a
covered sector). Among program participants, their level of
receipts from both types of programs (welfare and social in
surance) was lower. This somewhat surprising result may be
due to the family heads' difficulty in navigating the often
complex welfare/social insurance systems given his/her poor
English ability. Again, the net effect was that total transfer
payments to such families were lower than their native
counterparts. These findings are important because they im-
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ply that even if the proportion of immigrants comprised of
minorities and those with poor English skills were to increase
in the future, the use of transfers by immigrants relative to
the native-born would not necessarily increase.

Economic Success of Immigrants
Let us now look briefly at the other side of the coin. We've
been looking at what immigrants receive from the govern
ment. We now turn to the question of what they pay to the
government in the form of taxes. While information is not
directly available on tax payments perse, economic success is
a good indicator of the level of such payments. Using data
from the 1970 Census, Chiswick (1978) has studied this issue
extensively. He finds that, while earnings of immigrants are
initially below those of similar native-born workers, they
catch up to and eventually surpass their native-born counter
parts in earnings. Chiswick finds that the catch-up time is
about 13 years.
Using data from the 1976 Survey of Income and Educa
tion, Blau (1984) reports similar findings for wages. Her
estimated catch-up time is even shorter within 5 years.
Since she controls for English-speaking ability while
Chiswick does not, the Chiswick figure may be interpreted as
the total time required by immigrants to catch up to natives,
including the time necessary to acquire the requisite language
skills. From a policy perspective this concept may be more
relevant.
Regardless of which estimate of the catch-up period is
used, however, the data suggest that the lifetime earnings
(and consequently the lifetime tax payments) of an im
migrant who spends most of his/her working life in the U.S.
will most likely be higher than those of a comparable nativeborn individual. Of course actual tax payments will depend
also on the characteristics of immigrants vs. the native-born.
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However, Sehgal (1985) has shown, using data from 1983
Current Population Survey, that immigrant earnings catch
up to those of the native-born in about 10 years even if per
sonal characteristics are not controlled for.
Lest it be thought that these findings reflect the
peculiarities of the contemporary situation, it is interesting
to note that Blau (1980) uncovered a strikingly similar pat
tern for the early 1900s. Thus, the tendency of immigrants'
earnings to catch up to and eventually surpass those of their
native counterparts appears to be an extremely wellestablished empirical pattern.
It has also been found by both Blau (1980) for the early
1900s and Chiswick (1977) for 1969, that the children of im
migrants are more economically successful than otherwise
similar individuals who are the children of native-born
parents. As discussed above, older immigrants have their
own children in the U.S. who are contributing to social
security and other taxes and thus helping to finance the
transfer payments of older immigrants. The data actually
suggest that, all else equal, they are making higher contribu
tions than the children of natives.

Conclusion
A careful review of the evidence on transfer payments sug
gests that immigrants do not appear to overburden the
transfer system. There is no evidence that they have done so
in the past and no indication that there is any reason to be
concerned about the future. Indeed, immigrants were actual
ly found to receive lower welfare payments than otherwise
similar natives, and social insurance payments that were only
slightly higher. While they did receive higher transfer
payments, on average, this was primarily due to their being
an older population. A briefer review of the evidence regard-
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ing the economic success of immigrants suggested that the
tax payments made by them and by their children are likely
to equal or exceed those of the native-born.
Three qualifications regarding these findings should be
borne in mind. First, the data sets surveyed to reach these
conclusions most likely underrepresent illegal immigrants to
an unknown extent. Yet, the inclusion of illegals is not ex
pected to greatly alter our findings. In fact it is likely that
those who are in the country illegally, while paying the taxes
they owe, are less likely to collect transfer payments than the
legal group. The reason for this is simply that they would not
wish to draw attention to themselves; not paying taxes might
do so, as might attempting to collect transfers. For example,
if you were in the country illegally, would you be likely to go
to the unemployment insurance office and ask for your
unemployment check? Would you be likely to get involved
with the welfare system and have a caseworker visiting your
house? It seems probable that whatever problems illegal im
migrants may cause, a higher utilization of transfer
payments is most likely not one of them. However, it should
be emphasized that this is speculation. To definitively answer
this question, better data on the numbers, behavior patterns
and characteristics of illegal immigrants is needed.
Second, we pointed out that in terms of total transfer use,
families headed by minority individuals received lower
payments, all else equal. However, it was also true that the
welfare receipts of this group were higher and the social in
surance payments were lower than comparable families
headed by whites or Anglos. To the extent that policymakers
may wish to distinguish between contributory social in
surance programs and noncontributory welfare programs,
the higher proportion of minority individuals among im
migrants could then be considered a cause for concern.
Nonetheless, even if this is the case, it seems more equitable
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to try to alter the labor market situation which prevents the
minorities from getting the better jobs in sectors covered by
social insurance programs than to keep out minority popula
tions from abroad.
Third, and most seriously, there is an extremely important
question that has not been addressed here: what are the con
sequences for native-born individuals of competition from
immigrants? For example, if such competition results in
higher unemployment for certain native-born groups, that
could increase aggregate transfer payments, in this case those
to native-born individuals. If competition from immigrants
were to result in lower wages for some native-born groups,
that could result in lower aggregate tax revenues. Thus, to
fully address the issues considered here, we have to tackle the
extremely difficult task of estimating the consequences for
American workers of this competition from abroad.

NOTES
1. The statistics in the text on the origins and magnitude of immigration
are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1985 and Historical Statistics of
the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1.
2. This section draws upon my article, "The Use of Transfer Payments
by Immigrants," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 37 (January
1984), pp. 222-239. I am grateful to the publisher for allowing me to
summarize those results here. For an attempt to balance out the costs and
benefits of immigration at an aggregate level, see Simon (1981).
3. In the interests of clarity, the traditional practice of designating the
husband in a married couple family as the "head" is reluctantly follow
ed.
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4. Among immigrant heads who were 68 years of age or older in 1976, 28
percent of the men and 34 percent of the women arrived before 1920. An
additional 62 percent of the men and 58 percent of the women arrived
between 1920 and 1949; unfortunately, no more detailed breakdown for
the 1920-1949 period is available from the Survey of Income and Educa
tion. Similarly, among immigrant heads who were 65 or older, 88 percent
of the men and 91 percent of the women arrived before 1950.
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U.S. Immigration Policy
What Next?
Jagdish N. Bhagwati
Columbia University

United States immigration policy stands at the crossroads.
We have had a remarkable and passionate debate. The
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy
under Father Hesburgh's chairmanship was established in
October 1978 in response to growing concerns that had
already entered the public policy domain. It led, in turn, to
the introduction of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill into the House.
After nearly three years of tortuous legislative efforts to
enact it into law, Simpson-Mazzoli died in conference at the
end of the 98th Congress. By that time, the bill was already
weighed under by numerous compromises from its original
version, reflecting the exigencies of the legislative process
that prompted the witticism that there are two things you did
not want to see made: laws and sausage.
If we keep in view the facts that prominent intellectuals
and editorial writers threw their support behind SimpsonMazzoli, that the bill came very close to passage, that pas
sions have been aroused and lobbies activated, it is not sur
prising that the Congress has witnessed renewed efforts at
immigration legislation. In fact, fears that Simpson-Mazzoli
would rise again from its ashes led to early efforts by its op
ponents in the 99th Congress at heading off this threat.
Thus, Congressman Roybal had introduced a pre-emptive
Bill HR 30 and Congressman Garcia held fresh hearings on
ill
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immigration policy before his Subcommittee on Census and
Population, reflecting Hispanic concerns. Meanwhile,
Messrs. Simpson and Mazzoli have parted company and
each has sponsored new legislation aimed at immigration
control, with Senator Simpson teaming up now with Con
gressman Rodino this time around.
We need therefore to address, as clearly as we can, the
question: where do we turn at this juncture? You might be
tempted to dismiss this question on the cynical ground that
the intense arguments of the last few years and the
strangeness of the coalitions that formed around SimpsonMazzoli suggest that matters have gone beyond enlightened
analysis. Or you may fear that by now nothing worthwhile
could have been left unsaid. I hope to convince you,
however, that a fresh approach can indeed be proposed. And
I trust that you will share my optimism that rational
discourse has its role to play in every public policy debate, no
matter how contentious the issue in question.
To devise an appropriate policy, we must define desirable
objectives and suitable policy instruments to achieve those
objectives. As I shall argue presently, both the Select Com
mission and the Simpson-Mazzoli proponents shared essen
tially two popular objectives (i.e., reducing the flow of illegal
immigrants and rescuing these and the earlier stock of il
legals from an underclass status) and had two less popular
policy instruments (i.e., the employer sanctions and the
amnesty program) to achieve them. I shall also argue that,
ironically, these two policy instruments may be expected to
produce the opposite results from those desired, reminding
me of Max Weber's celebrated remark about the "paradox
of unanticipated consequences." And I shall propose that we
now think of a wholly different approach to achieving the
Simpson-Mazzoli objectives. 1
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But, before I do that, I do wish to consider at the outset
why immigration has come to be regarded as a major public
policy question. A delineation, and then a dispassionate ex
amination, of the concerns that have elevated immigration
reform to our attention will serve to provide me with an
assessment of the worthwhileness of the Simpson-Mazzoli
objectives and hence to place my changed policy approach to
them into proper context.

A Litany of Concerns
The most compelling aspect of the immigration situation
today is that we have a significant amount of illegal immigra
tion. The concerns of reasonable commentators, even if the
conjectures on which they proceed are often unreasonable,
proceed from this central fact. And indeed, the illegality of
the immigration inflow, not the total legal numbers admitted
by us annually, occupies the center of the stage. Why?
First, it raises the specter of vast inflows from a seething
mass of humanity. Imagine becoming part of Greater Mex
ico, or worse still, part of Greater Caribbean and Central
America as well! The large numbers being bandied about on
the "undocumented" aliens, the euphemism for illegal im
migrants, have helped this alarmist perception. Unless we
"regain control of our borders," we will be swamped. The
faintly ridiculous zero population growth (ZPG) movement,
which seeks to freeze population levels, has derived par
ticular solace, and much mileage, from this cataclysmic
scenario which I shall presently argue to be exaggerated.
Second, the illegality raises fear that it will breed more il
legality in turn. This perception, while patently false, has
been accentuated by the accounts of the Mariel Cuban im
migrants' problems in Florida.
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Third, closely tied to illegality is the question of ethnicity.
Many of the illegal immigrants are, naturally, Hispanics who
can and do simply walk across the Rio Grande. Unlike in the
immigration debates which attended the first enactment of
our national immigration legislation in 1921, racist
arguments simply will not be tolerated today. However, the
heavy bias of the illegal influx in favor of Hispanics has rais
ed more fear of encroachment by a second language more
than by a different culture. Today, the iron fist of a domi
nant Anglo-Saxon culture that tended to produce a
homogeneous, assimilated mass of second-generation
children who embraced the English language unquestioningly is no longer in evidence. The growing emphasis on ethnic
diversity, and indeed pride therein, militates against the
homogenization process. In this new cultural context, the
Hispanic domination of the illegal influx, with threat of
many more to come, creates serious concerns. 2
Fourth, illegality of the influx has created the apprehen
sion that a finely tuned policy of immigration, delicately
balancing costs and benefits to us through careful selection
of numbers and composition, is being undermined by an un
controlled inflow that must therefore, prima facie, be harm
ful to us. This concern was especially acute during the prerecovery slump when it was feared that a tough unemploy
ment situation was being worsened by the "peso refugees'*:
Hispanics moving north in search of jobs as the developing
countries of Latin America, especially Mexico, got mired in
the slump and drowned in their debt. 3 But the concern was
also acute among some that illegals would prove to be a net
burden on the fiscal system, though studies commissioned by
the Hesburgh Commission found little support for this
presupposition.
Fifth, and finally, illegal immigration has created a
humanitarian issue. The illegal aliens represent an
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underclass, often subsisting better than where they came
from, but evidently in conditions and with civil rights that,
because of fear of seizure and deportation, are simply not
asserted enough to be a practical reality. You may have
heard the story of the Jewish couple who, on complimenting
the illegal-immigrant Chinese waiter in a Brooklyn Szechwan
restaurant for speaking tolerable Yiddish, found the
manager rushing up to them and remonstrating: "Hush, he
thinks he is learning English!" It is widely believed that con
cern with this altruistic aspect of the immigration situation,
rather than the more narrowly self-serving arguments I have
detailed, led former Secretary of Labor, Ray Marshall, to
persuade President Carter to adopt immigration reform as
an important goal of his administration. Out of these con
cerns came the two principal objectives of the Select Com
mission and Simpson-Mazzoli. One was simply to restrict
immigration, or rather the illegal component. The other was
to ameliorate the deplorable conditions in which the
underclass of illegal immigrants found itself.

Facts and Realities
I should emphasize immediately that the perception that
we are being flooded by unusually large numbers of im
migrants is not based on facts. For instance, legal immigra
tion during 1950-1970, according to U.S. Bureau of Census
data, has averaged less than half of the peak level during
1900-1909! If adjustment is made for the rise in population,
the reduction in legal immigration flows is even more strik
ing. Immigrant inflows as a percent of resident U.S. popula
tion has in fact fluctuated between less than 0.1 percent dur
ing the war years to roughly 0.2 percent during 1950-1980,
with a peak of 0.35 percent during 1980 when the absolute
immigration inflow was just under 800,000. If adjustment is
made further for emigration a phenomenon that partly
reflects a life-cycle return of the immigrants, and which has
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been there since the 19th century the figures of net im
migration fall somewhat further below the absolute levels of
roughly 400,000 on average through the 1970s.
Yet another striking fact, brought to our attention by
Kingsley Davis, is that the proportion of foreign-born to
total population in the U.S. has been falling steadily since
1910 until it was less than 5 percent in 1970, whereas it has
risen in recent history in many countries including Australia,
Switzerland, France and Sweden and, in fact, exceeds hand
somely our 1970 proportion in these countries plus others
such as Canada and New Zealand. For a country built on im
migration, these facts suggest that our legal immigration
policy has not been lax or overly generous in any persuasive
sense.
The illegal inflow does impact on this argument, since our
susceptibility to it is considered generally to be greater than
in many of these countries, with the exception of France. But
not by any means as much as the early claims in the range of
8 to 12 million suggested by Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS). These estimates, unfounded as they were, pro
fited from a law I have formulated: that any statistics will
win against no statistics. And these numbers came to be
widely circulated. Studies prompted by the Select Commis
sion have now dispelled the myths they created. 4 It appears
that, in the late 1970s, the stock of illegal residents is likely to
have been between 3.5 and 6 million not more. That means
that the flow is likely to have been substantially less, for the
border has been a porous sieve for quite some time.
My own judgment, given these numbers, is that immigra
tion reform arguments based on immigration being "too
large" are implausible. Any economist familiar with the
theories of the consequences of immigration must admit to a
complex of positive and negative effects. With the immigra
tion flows being such small proportions of the population
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and the workforce, the net economic gains or losses (if any)
from these levels of immigration must shrink into relative in
significance.
I would be tempted to conclude therefore, that, at least as
far as the economic effects of the present immigration levels
are concerned, there should not be cause for alarm. That im
migration, therefore, may be treated as a phenomenon
rather than a problem. In fact, if one looks not merely at the
short-term effects of the current recovery but also at
demographic trends that project a labor shortage by the early
decades of the next century, it is possible to contemplate with
greater equanimity the fearful projections of growing
streams of new immigrants from the Caribbean and Latin
American countries, propelled to us by distress, disruption
or simply desire.
No one can, however, firmly refute the grim scenarios.
Doubtless, Puerto Ricans have not flooded the U.S., empty
ing their land. Italians have not moved en masse to West
Germany from the poverty of the south, despite freedom of
movement in the European Community. Wages are typically
not equalized, even within the same country, by migration.
Custom, commitment, risk-aversion, hope, family, attach
ment to land, financial incapacity to move: these and other
economic and social factors shape and constrain outmigration to the more prosperous areas. But large movements do
occur. Responsible immigration policy cannot be predicated
on the most promising scenarios. As the financier Felix
Rohatyn would put it, this would be like "betting the com
pany."

The Two Objectives
I therefore accept, as a reasonable policy objective, the
premise that we should bring illegal immigration under con
trol.
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As I have stressed already, the other Simpson-Mazzoli ob
jective, which I happen to share with greater enthusiasm, is a
social and moral one. The illegal aliens who get in, willynilly, past the door are indeed, despite Brusati's poignant
Bread and Chocolate, substantially better off than where
they come from. But they are at the bottom of our social and
economic hierarchy, living in conditions that are significant
ly below what our moral standards require. If they live
abroad in appalling conditions, exploited and destitute,
distance places them beyond our view and responsibility. But
in our midst, even though illegally, their condition offends
our moral sensibility. The condition of the underclass cannot
be ignored by a civilized society, certainly not by ours. 5

The Simpson-Mazzoli Policy Instruments
The approach embodied in Simpson-Mazzoli, and indeed
originating in the recommendations of the Select Commis
sion, offered two policies to address these two objectives.
Both policies, employer sanctions and an amnesty, were far
less popular than the two objectives. For example, compell
ing objections to employer sanctions were raised in Hispanic
circles.
As Antonia Hernandez, speaking for the Mexican
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund before
Representative Garcia's Subcommittee, remarked
(December 9, 1982):
Employer sanctions won't work and will
discriminate . . .
The ID system: I am reminded that during Father
Hersberg's [sic] testimony in favor of H.R. 7357,
he said there was nothing discriminatory with an ID
system. He used an example I would like to restate
here. He carries ID cards, the American Express
and as Chairman of the Board of Chase Manhattan
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Bank. Those cards are symbols of prestige, of
status.
The ID system, any ID system to [the Hispanic]
community will carry a badge of inferiority, a
badge that we, each and every one of us will have to
carry. We will not be able to show our American
Express. We will not be able to show our American
passport, or that we are on the board of a Fortune
500 company.
To the members of the Hispanic community, the
employer sanctions and the ID will be that badge of
inferiority. We will have to prove who we are just
because of the color of our skin and the accent in
our speech.
I must confess that I have considerable sympathy for the
Hispanic concerns. My first reaction was, of course, unsym
pathetic since I tended to discount the possibility of
discrimination that could follow the enactment of employer
sanctions much as Father Hesburgh did. My views now are
somewhat changed, for I cannot discount fears that are so
widespread and obviously rooted in personal experiences of
the Hispanic community. But, even if there were no other
objections to their enactment, employer sanctions, and in
deed amnesty, together define a set of policy instruments
which are unlikely to achieve the intended objectives. In fact,
they may lead to exactly the opposite results from those
desired! Let me argue why.
The Simpson-Mazzoli approach, as stated, rested on two
policy instruments: employer sanctions and an amnesty.
Employer sanctions would make it illegal to hire un
documented aliens. In eliminating the 1952 Texas proviso,
the Bill in its conference committee version would have even
imposed criminal penalties for persistent infractions. By
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"cutting off jobs" in the U.S, the Bill (and indeed the Select
Commission before it) expected to eliminate the magnet that
draws in the illegals and thus cripple their inflow. Coupled
with the sanctions was, of course, the amnesty provision.
While simultaneously expected to play the political role of
lubricating Hispanic consent to the employer sanctions, its
principal rationale was surely the rescue of the enormous
backlog (or stock) of illegals from its underclass status. Be
tween them, the sanctions and the amnesty would then
eliminate the stock of illegals, cut deeply into their new in
flow and thus achieve the desired twin objectives.
Ironically, however, these two policies are likely to in
crease the illegal inflow, and therefore, shortly thereafter,
the stock as well, whereas I am afraid that the underclass
status may paradoxically worsen.
Simply put, the problem is that employer sanctions can be
expected to be ineffective (quite consistent with the possibili
ty that, as the Hispanic community fears, they will impact
adversely on the civil rights of that community through
discrimination in hiring), owing to reasons which are deeply
rooted in our social, political and juridical traditions. At the
same time, sanctions will draw resources away from border
enforcement where the numbers that daily get past our
border patrol are naturally affected somewhat by the level of
enforcement. Thus, the net result could well be, paradoxical
ly enough, an increase in the rate of illegal immigration! At
the same time, by increasing the harassment at work,
employer sanctions could well increase the sense of exposure
and vulnerability characteristic of the underclass status.
The ineffectiveness of employer sanctions can be safely
predicted. Self-interest alone can be expected to lead the
employers to oppose the INS through lobbying and litiga
tion, draining its budget and weakening effective enforce
ment. Such a prospect also derives from the several, highly
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articulate and energetic lobbying groups of ethnic Americans
who, as before this subcommittee, have in fact opposed
employer sanctions strenuously. But if self-interest alone was
involved in weakening the effectiveness of employer sanc
tions, I would be less pessimistic than I am. As it happens,
morality is the more critical factor and, in this instance, only
weakens further the enforceability of sanctions. Our natural
instincts make it hard to collaborate in efforts to seize and
deport, no matter what we think of illegal immigration in the
abstract. The critical factor is that we are dealing with
human beings. As the Swiss novelist Max Frisch has remark
ed of the guestworkers' experience in Western Europe: "we
asked for workers but got men instead."
The intense moral dilemma posed by this fact is illustrated
again and again in our experience with enforcing immigra
tion laws. Thus, our courts have repeatedly (though not
always) struck down discrimination against legal aliens,
defining a civil rights tradition that is truly laudable and
almost unique. But they have gone further and found in
favor of even illegal aliens who, it has often been argued,
have no locus standi in the first place in view of their illegal
presence! Notable here are the celebrated Texas judgment in
1980 by Federal Judge Woodrow Seals who upheld the rights
of illegal aliens' children to public education, and the 1984
Supreme Court ruling that illegal aliens are entitled to the
protection of federal labor laws. A Corpus Christi, Texas
jury initially acquitted Jack Elder on charges of illegally
transporting aliens into the U.S. although he was later con
victed in a federal court. Mr. Elder's defense was simply a
moral one, i.e., that he and his associate Roman Catholic lay
workers were offering sanctuary to Salvadorans fleeing
political persecution! 6
Yet again, it is remarkable that in the case of the Haitian
boat people, when the administration reacted to their arrival
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by unprecedented incarceration, it was not long before civil
rights groups took up their cause, resulting in some relief and
protracted legal proceedings awaiting resolution. Therefore,
I would argue that the much discussed finding of the GAO
that employer sanctions have not been particularly effective
elsewhere, 7 even though some countries such as France and
Canada have chosen subsequently to increase their reliance
on them, applies with unquestionable force in our case.
By contrast, enhanced border enforcement has resulted in
increased interceptions. Between 1965 and 1970, the seized il
legals tripled to well over 300,000 annually. In recent years,
the numbers have approximated as much as a million.
Doubtless, this reflects increased attempts at entry. But it
would be ludicrous to suggest that stepped-up enforcement
by the Border Patrol, now totaling over 2,500, has played no
role. Even if every intercepted alien tries to get back in again
(and indeed many must, if the million annual interceptions
are to be reconciled with the scaled-down illegal stock
estimates suggested earlier by me), the increased rate of ap
prehension from more enforcement must affect in some
degree the total numbers that successfully get through. The
reduction in inflows, in this fashion, is not likely to be very
substantial any more than India can hope to stem the tide of
Bangladesh immigrant influx into Assam by building a fence
and stepping up its enforcement along a massive, quasi-open
border. But it is certainly likely to be greater than from
employer sanctions, dollar for dollar.
As for the amnesty program, the other pillar of the
Simpson-Mazzoli architecture, I am afraid that too is flaw
ed. One can plausibly maintain that it could accelerate the in
flux, magnifying the total size of the illegal immigrant
population in the foreseeable future, while increasing their
underclass status. Although the numbers who seek to come
across are not sensitive to small changes in relative wages,
the disparities between Mexico and the U.S. being so enor-
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mous, it is probable that a dramatic improvement in wages
expected here could make a noticeable difference in the
numbers that do wish to try to get past the border. Unfor
tunately, from this viewpoint, an amnesty creates the prob
lem that it translates an illegal status with a low associated
wage into legal status with a distinct improvement in the
wage earned, now and through subsequent upward mobility
along the legal job ladder. Since, in economics and in public
policy, bygones are rarely bygones, an amnesty now may
well lead to the expectation of an amnesty again, in which
case we would be encouraging more to attempt illegal entry.
Then again, if Representative Garcia is right that the most
liberal amnesty program that we can get through the House
and enact into legislation will not legalize more than 25 per
cent of the suspected undocumented population currently in
the United States, we face the ironic outcome that the amnes
ty will eventually lead to more illegal immigrants here than
we rescued from that status. Caution about the small pro
portion that will likely secure the benefit of the amnesty is in
deed well-grounded in view of the numerous constraints that
afflict eligibility and the associated problems that pertain
thereto.
Is it not also likely that the INS will feel compelled, once
an amnesty has been offered and implemented, to "go
after" and harass more intensely those who remain illegal?
Those not reborn may appear the more damnable! Greater
internal enforcement, with or without employer sanctions,
that will probably follow the completion of the amnesty pro
gram, will only make the large numbers of present and arriv
ing illegals more insecure, accentuating their underclass
status and psychology.

A Different Approach
I propose therefore that we take an altogether different
approach. In essence, we should greatly diminish internal en-
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forcement and correspondingly increase external enforce
ment, i.e., at the border. As I have already stressed, border
enforcement cannot greatly reduce, leave aside eliminate, the
influx as long as we (quite correctly) seek to control the
border in a way consistent with our moral sensibilities and
traditions which preclude Soviet bloc-style techniques. I
wish, of course, that we showed the same sensibilities where
we extend economic aid and patrolling capabilities to a coun
try which then is, in effect, "bribed" into taking into its own
population, potential emigrants to our shores, the kind of
morally offensive action that we ourselves would not take
against them! Evidently, I have in mind our relationship with
Haiti in this regard. But, despite our morally constrained
techniques of border enforcement, such enforcement will
doubtless have some impact.
Besides, border enforcement would be sufficiently visible
to satisfy those who feel that we should be "doing more" to
regain control of our border. In public policy, the advantage
of such visible, symbolic action is much too understated.
Where a problem is not capable of total solution, such action
acquires great importance. Thus, while I believe that the late
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's decision to construct a fence
along the enormous India-Bangladesh border in the State of
Assam was an ineffective policy, and (before the Indian
government suspended the construction owing to
Bangladesh governmental protests) I had a bet with the then
Governor of Assam that it would only be a matter of weeks
before the fence would be selling inch by inch in the bazaars
of Dacca in Bangladesh, I believe that it was nonetheless a
splendid policy. For, to be seen to be doing nothing at all,
even though one could not really close the border, would
have been politically explosive since it would have been read
as indifference or indecisiveness. And building the fence was
the least disruptive way of doing nothing while appearing to
be doing something!
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In our instance, enhanced border enforcement will indeed
produce some tangible result, for reasons I have spelled out.
But it needs to be supplemented by what I believe is a more
effective policy, which is indeed the "price" counterpart of
the enforcement policy. It is also a policy which builds up
over the long haul when the more alarming scenarios of
stepped-up attempts at entry might be more relevant. This is
the active encouragement of the creation of an "economic
fence" at the border, by promoting investments and
economic activity along the long border. This "economic
fence" can then act as an incentive to step off the escalator
to the United States hinterland. We need to explore actively,
keeping the government of Mexico informed and in con
sultation, the creation of such an economic fence, envisaging
something like the counterpart of "free trade zones" around
the world. The economic fence would instead be a "free
mobility zone" with investment benefits that attract the
economic activity that would constitute the fence-principle
that I envisage. 8
As we shift our attention to the border to regulate the in
flux of immigrants, I would simultaneously downgrade in
ternal enforcement. 9 This would include dropping the idea of
employer sanctions. It would also mean going easy on INS
enforcement, much as we did during the last census count. A
de facto policy posture of this kind, which preserves the im
portant distinction between legality and illegality while not
seeking to divide the population energetically into the two
categories through INS activity, would substantially reduce
the unease of the illegal aliens that makes their exploitation
rather easier.
This mix of policies, which puts the focus of immigration
control and reform back at the border, offers the prospect
therefore of getting as close to our two central and popular
objectives as is possible. Mainly it requires executive action
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to reduce INS enforcement at home (an art, I might remark,
the administration has practiced successfully with some
other agencies), legislative action to increase the border en
forcement budget substantially, and an active encourage
ment of the "free mobility zone" program I have suggested.

NOTES
1. See also my opinion editorial article, "Control Immigration at the
Border," Wall Street Journal, February 1,1985 and my testimony before
Congressman Garcia at the Subcommittee on Census and Population,
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on March 26, 1985.
2. James Fallows, Washington editor of The Atlantic, has been par
ticularly concerned with this aspect of the immigration question. See also
his testimony before Congressman Garcia on March 26, 1985, op. cit.
3. This issue has surfaced with greater urgency in public perception
recently, as the collapse in oil prices and the accentuation of the debt
crisis in Mexico since January 1986 have been accompanied by a reported
surge in the number of apprehensions of illegals attempting to cross the
border. Thus, the New York Times (February 21, 1986, pp. Al and A15)
reports: "The Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser
vice warned today that, there has been a 'startling' surge of illegal aliens
entering the United States from Mexico in recent months. 'We are seeing
the greatest surge of people in history across our Southern border,' Com
missioner Alan C. Nelson said at a news conference called to renew the
agency's appeal for tougher immigration laws." In turn, the New York
Times (February 24, 1986) renewed its call to the President to support the
passage of the immigration bills before Congress, especially the employer
sanctions which I discuss and reject below.
4. See, in particular, the study by the staff of the Bureau of the Census
for the Select Commission, conducted by Messrs. Siegel, Passel and
Robinson, and included in Appendix E of the Commission's Final
Report.
5. Two observations are pertinent. Where we insist on treating im
migrants, legal and illegal, on a par with natives, the "cost" of immigra
tion rises relative to potential benefits. Insofar, therefore, as we reject
immigrants on the ground that their immigration is harmful to us, there
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is a moral-philosophical dilemma here: by insisting on equality of treat
ment if we admit them, we reject their entry and thus force them to live
abroad in yet greater destitution (but safely distant from our view)! Next,
our aversion to treating immigrants differentially from natives itself may
be consonant with the way, psycho-culturally, U.S. society treats
adopted children on a par with natural children. Perhaps it is not surpris
ing that Japan, where adoption is relatively infrequent and confined
generally within relatives (as in the classic case of the novelist Soseki Natsume), the attitudes towards immigrants, whose entry is severely
restricted, is not exemplary whereas the United States exhibits the op
posite pattern in both dimensions.
6. As of going to press, the question of sanctuary is still in the courts,
arousing intense passions of the kind which I believe to be precisely what
would undermine the efficacy of attempts at enforcing sanctions.
7. In August 1982, the GAO released their report: Information on the
Enforcement of Laws Regarding Employment of Aliens in Selected
Countries. The study was conducted at the request of the Senate Sub
committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Committee on the
Judiciary. Based on questionnaire replies by 20 countries and visits to
four (Canada, Germany, France and Switzerland), these latter all having
some form of employer sanctions, the GAO study found that the sanc
tions were generally ineffective for reasons including the facts that judges
were generally too lenient, regarding illegal employment as not a
"serious offense." This underlines exactly the point that I am making in
this lecture. See also the statement by William Anderson, director,
General Government Division before the Subcommittee on Census and
Population, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on The
Demographic Impact of Immigration on the United States, in the
presence of Congressman Garcia, on March 26, 1985.
8. Such an economic fence on the Mexican side would have the advan
tage that one could legally pay wages lower than the U.S. minimum wage
but higher than in Mexico, and thus hold illegals back from attempting
entry since slightly lower wages would be traded off against legality and
Mexican residence in contrast to residence in U.S. as an underclass.
9. The irrational fascination with internal enforcement (perhaps also a
puritanical reaction against those "aiding and abetting" in the violation
of our "sovereign borders" and defense thereof) in preference to border
enforcement is apparent also in other areas, e.g., narcotics traffic.
William Safire recently wrote in the New York Times (February 26,
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1986): "The most glaring difficulty in our war on drugs is that we have
all but abandoned the front line: the border is relatively undefended. The
classic bureaucratic battle between the Justice Department, which
believes in tips by informants and criminal prosecutions, and the
Customs Service of the Treasury Department, which tries to interdict
drugs at our borders, has been won by Justice."
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